Anti Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam
31st January 1999
Chapter 14
 

QADIANI AND PAKISTAN MOVEMENT

 

The War Supported

With the outbreak of the Second World War, Mirza Mahmud announced full support of the Ahmadiyya Community to the British. He advised his followers to pray for the British success and declares his firm belief in their ‘just and glorious’ rule. Neither Germans nor Russians could extend the type of assistance to Ahmadis as the British had been extending to them, the emphasized. If Ahmadis had to select any one to rule over them they should select only the British, had they been wise. He advised those Congressmen who were against ‘the exploitation of Indian resources for Imperialist ends’ to support the British during the War. They must support the British whether they consider them good or bad. If India will not support them, it will not only be putting itself in great trouble but the coming generations have to bemoan for ever. 1

The Muslim League conditionally supported the Government. A resolution was passed on 18 September, 1939 promising support on the condition that no constitutional advance in India should be made without the approval of the Muslim League, the sole representative organization of Muslim India.

In March, 1939 Mirza Mahmud completed 25 years of his ‘Khilafat.’ On the occasion of Khilafat Jubilee Gathering in December 1939 he announced:

‘It is not an ordinary War. Our Jama'at will be affected by it. They must extend every possible help to the British. A Secretary for War is proposed to be appointed from every Ahmadi Jama'at who will be responsible to carry out the directives of the Center (Qadian) concerning the War and mobilize Ahmadiyya support for it. This support is must for Islam and Ahmadiyyat.’ 2 Mirza Mahmud gave different types of arguments to mobilize Indian public support for the War. At an annual gatherings in 1942 he declared: ‘So far as India is concerned, I have on several occasion, expressed the opinion that in the event of a German victory, we shall be very much worst off and that a British victory is bound to lead to an improvement in India’s affairs. Some of us are apt to imagine that if we were to remain a subject nation it is immaterial whether we are subordinate to this power or that, but this is an entirely mistaken point of view… Great Britain already enjoys domination over the most tempting parts of the Old World, to the confines of China. The US enjoys economic domination over the rest of the world. They are like a person who is already filed to repletion, and a person so well fed is not much inclined towards highhandedness and tyranny… Again, the old powers do not normally interfere in matter of religion and, except in extreme case or political or economic necessity, do not apply even secret orI indirect pressure in these matters.3 Qadianis were the greatest champion of extending unconditional support to Britain in its war efforts4 They endeavored to dispel the disbelief regarding the British promises. The people of India, however, believed that the British offers were only for bribing them to secure a victory in the War. Britain would repudiate its promises as soon as the War was over.

Qadianis nourished hopes to succeed the British, in case they would leave India. Mirza Mahmud made his followers believe that the World War II would last till Ahmadis would be prepared to take over the charge of the Government.5 Alluding to the meeting of Moses with Khizer, he concluded as God saved the treasure belonging to two orphans till they attained their maturity, similarly the tribulations would prolong till Ahmadis were sufficiently trained to take over the charge of the Government of their own from the British.

Ahmadiyya Company

A year before the War, Mirza Mahmud urged upon his community to receive military training. He ordered young Ahmadis to join army or police. "The Ahmadis of Punjab had a special responsibility to fulfil, he said, because they were comparatively in majority in the Punjab. Secondly the Punjab provides manpower to British military and Ahmadiyyat had reached those families who offered themselves for recruitment. Moreover, the Punjab is the Center of Ahmadiyyat and all its religious Centers are there. The Jama'at should prepare itself for any eventuality. Ahmadis should join territorial force which is established by the Government to maintain law and order in the country. Punjab Regiment Territorial Force 11/15 had an Ahmadiyya company since its establishment."6 The 15/15 Punjab Regiment comprised four companies viz. Punjabi Musalmans(PM), Jats, Christians and Ahmadis. During the war another Punjab Regiment 8/15 was also raised. Ahmadis insisted on their separate entity and did not join the Punjabi Musalman Company. Mirza Sharif Ahmad was given the rank of captain in the Ahmadiyya Company. His son Mirza Daud Ahmad was posted as colonel in 1941-42 in Ahmadiyya Company, Khyber Agency. In 1942, he was Captain-in-Charge of CharBagh Fort, Khyber Agency. The British feared Russian attack from the North and took special measures to check the political upsurge in Shinwari tribes.

A prominent Qadiani elder Khalifa Salahuddin Ahmad says the Ahmadiyya Company in the Territorial Force was under the Command of Mirza Sharif Ahmad Ch. Abdullah Khan, the honorary lieutenant was second in command. After his death he (Salahuddin) joined the Company. In those days Major Goreng came from Britain and was posted in their unit. He kept a strict watch on the activities of the Company. After a few days he secretly told him that he had been given special instructions in Britain to keep a close check on Ahmadiyya Company because Ahmadiyya Jama'at had been rising like the prophets of Beni-Isreal.7

The Foreign Affairs Department of Qadian organized the recruitment of Ahmadis from all parts of India into Territorial Force and registered their names in the territorial Force without further loss of time. They indicated their nationality as ‘Ahmadi’ in the recruiting forms 8 with a view to maintaining their separate entity.

A glimpse at the services rendered by the Ahmadis during the Second War can be had in J.D.Shams, Qadiani missionary London’s present to H.M the King Emperor on the New Year Day (1946). He says:

‘H.M. the King will be pleased to know that our Jama'at has provided all possible help in securing the victory for Britain. There were fifteen thousand Ahmadi soldiers, two to three hundred of Commissioned and non-commissioned Officers served in the Second War. It is quite a large figure as compared to the total population of our Jama'at.’ 9 The Qadiani missionary then quotes a revelation of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (November 1900) wherein God is said to have communicated to Mirza that ‘since the British were lenient to him that had been the reason he favoured them. Those who looked to the Heaven had no fear at all.’ Shams concludes ‘It is our firm belief that because of these revelations, God saved the British from a defeat during the 1st and Second world Wars.’ 10

Lahore Resolution

On 23 March 1940 the Muslim League adopted the Lahore Resolution which became the basis for Pakistan. It well be of interest to refer to a controversy which started in late 1981 over the role of Zafarullah at that critical juncture of Muslim history.

Wali Khan, a senior politician of Pakistan, in an interview with the weekly Chattan, Lahore (21 December, 1981) alleged that Sir Zafarullah was responsible for the authorship of 23 March 1940 Resolution commonly called Pakistan Resolution. It stirred up a controversy in the national press. He based his assertion on a note written by Sir Zafarullah to the Viceroy in February 1940 when he was a member of his Executive Council. Wali Khan 11 elaborated his point of view from the writings of then Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgo. In reply to Wali Khan’s assertions, Zafarullah clarified that in the capacity of member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, he did write a note on Dominion Status for India in mid-February 1940. But he discussed two schemes in it. One was Pakistan scheme and the other was separation of India plan. Pakistan scheme propounded by Ch .Rahmat Ali, he argues, involved a wholesale exchange of population and was "impractical" and "chimerical" while he considered separation of India scheme practical in nature. Pakistan scheme involved the North-Eastern Federation consisting the Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Frontier tribal areas. The rest of India may constitute itself into more federations than one, if desirable. The significant feature of this scheme was that "the N-E Federation and N-W Federations will be in direct relation with the Crown and so will be Federation or Federations constituted by rest of India." 12

Zafarullah sent his note to Viceroy Lord Linlithgo on 6 March 1940, who forwarded it to Lord Zetland, the then Secretary for India, with the following remarks:

‘I sent by the last bag a copy of Zafarullah’s note on dominion Status which I remarked purported to be statement of the position from extremer point of view. I introduced that qualification because I have not at that time had an opportunity of discussing its precise nature with him and certain of the propositions contained in it, were likely to appear formally under the name of a Member of my council, might, I think, have justified a description in those terms.   I asked him yesterday to put me a little more in the picture, and he told me first that this is a first draft only; secondly that, provided he is protected on that point and the paper is not used publicly, I may do what I like with it, including sending a copy to you; thirdly that copies have been passed to Jinnah and I think to Hydari and fourthly that while he, Zafarullah cannot of course admit its authorship, his document has been prepared for adoption by the Muslim League with a view to its being given the fullest publicity (Italics added). I cannot claim even yet to have had time to absorb it fully, and I would prefer to suspend my comments on it until later. But it is a substantial and trenchant piece of work and I shall be greatly interested in your own reaction to it.’ 13 Wali Khan contends that the separations scheme propounded by Zafarullah was adopted after about fortnight by the Muslim League at its Lahore session on 23 March 1940, as given in the Viceroy’s note. He means to say that a Qadiani, in collusion with the British, gave the idea of Partition of India which became Magna Carta of the Muslim League after 1940.

Zafarullah admits that the Muslim League Resolution of 23 March 1940 and the separation scheme given in his note are almost exactly the same. The expression 'Pakistan' was implied officially on this scheme by the Muslim League Convention of 9 April 1946 14. However the conclusions drawn by Wali Khan are incorrect.

Zafarullah states:

‘The insinuation that my note was prepared at the suggestion of Lord Linlithgo and was sponsored by him as to play down ‘The Pakistan idea which was for catching the Muslim imagination’ is, I regret to have to observe, wholly false and unfounded. It is clear from Lord Linlithgo’s letter to Lord Zetland that Lord Linlithgo had nothing whatever to do with the preparation or contents of my note, the entire responsibility for which rests on me.’ 15 A perusal of Lord Linlithgo’s correspondence with Lord Zetland reveals that he did not give much importance to Pakistan demand. On 25 March 1940, a day after the Muslim League’s adoption of the Lahore Resolution, Lord Linlithgo wrote to Lord Zetland: ‘I do not attach too much importance to Jinnah’s demands for the carrying out of India with an indefinite number of religious areas, or it prepares to use the phrase, an indefinite number of so called ‘Dominions.’ And I would judge myself that his attitude at the moment is that, as Congress are putting forward a preposterous claim which they know is incapable of acceptances, he equally will put forward just as extreme a claim of impracticability of realizing which he is probably just as well aware, but existence of which with, while reaffirming the Muslim attitude of hostility to Congress claims, take away some at any rate of the damaging charge which has hitherto been leveled against them that they have no constructive ideas of their own.’ 16 Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India replied to Lord Linlithgo on 5 April 1940: ‘I think that in the course of forthcoming debate I shall be bound to express my dissent from the proposals which has been recently put forward by All- India Muslim League in the course of their recent conference at Lahore. I should very much doubt whether they have been properly thought and in any case to create a number of Ulsters in India, would not only mean the wrecking of all that one had been working for a number of years past, but would also, I imagine, give rise to the most violent opposition on the part of the Congress and possibly of other who are not actually attached to the Congress in India.’ 17 The Pakistan issue also came up under discussion in the House of Commons. Its debate of 18 April 1940 clearly shows the bias and disapproval of members on division of India and creation of a chain of Independent Muslim states stretching from the North West to the East of India. 18

The proposal was ‘something not a far short of a counsel of despair.’ Its acceptance would be admission of the failure of all efforts of ‘England and India’s, based on assumption that Indian unity was possible and desirable.’ 19

Qadiani Council Meeting

Qadiani attitude towards Muslim aspirations was totally negative during the 1940s. It proves that Qadianis were not in favour of Pakistan or a separate Muslim state in India. In the last week of March (1940), the Report on the sub committee of the Ahmadiyya Foreign Department came under discussion in the 20th Advisory Council Meeting at Qadian. Syed Zainul Abdin, Head of the Foreign Affairs Department, discussed the issue of Ahmadiyya’s joining either the League or the Congress. He and Pir Akbar Ali narrated past events and by a majority vote, the matter was put off for the next meeting in 1941. It was decided that by that time efforts would be made to arrive at a mutual agreement with the League and the Congress. Hazrat Amirul Mominin (Mahmud Ahmad) gave his decision in favour of majority.20

Mirza Mahmud instructed his disciples to join the Congress in order to gain favour of the Congress leadership. The political climate changed sharply after 1940. A majority of Muslims were leaving the Congress in favour of Muslim League. Pakistan idea sharply gained currency and it was felt that only establishment of Pakistan could solve economic and political problems of Muslims of India. The British also gave serious thought to the solution of Indian problem. There is no evidence to prove that Qadian was inclined to the idea of Pakistan. Nor did they extend any practical support to the League. All their energies were directed towards the war and spying activities abroad.

Cripps Mission

The Congress Governments resigned in the late 1939 on the plea that the British Government had dragged India into the Second World War without the consent of its people, the League observed Day of Deliverance on 22 December.

In August, 1940 Lord Linlithgo made an offer which, apart from others, envisaged the expansion of the Executive Council of the Governor General and the establishment of an Advisory War Council. The offer was rejected by all political parties of India. Many factors including the Japanese entry in the War and her speedy success, pressure exerted by the US President Roosevelt and growing public opinion at home for an early solution of India problem forced the British to review their policy towards India.

In March 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps came to India with his offer. It was published on 20 March 1942 and provided for Indian Independence after the War and conceded the right of self-determination to the provincial units. As under the proposed arrangements, provinces were free to remain within India or opt out of the Indian Union, the provinces where Muslims were in a majority could presumably form their own federation i.e. Pakistan in due course. Cripps also gave an understanding that with the exception of Defense Department, other departments would be completely in the hands of the Indian and the Governor General will act as constitutional head. However at the later stage he withdrew that statement. This made the Congress suspicious regarding the honesty of the British Government. The Congress wanted the Executive Council of the Governor General to work as Cabinet. This British Government was not prepared to concede.

Sir Zafarullah was the member of the Executive Council during the War. He claims that he urged upon the Viceroy that the minimum need was that the Council should be enlarged so as to be composed of an overall majority of Indians. On the Viceroy’s recommendation His Majesty's Government agreed and from September 1941 onwards Indian representatives had a preponderant voice in the central administration of their country. A representative of British commercial interests in India, Sir Edward Benthall, was included in the enlarged Council. Within a year of the enlargement of the Council, Zafarullah accepted a seat on the Bench of the Supreme Court of India. 21

On the outbreak of the Second World War, the Department of War Supply was established by the British Government in India. Zafarullah, the law member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council was appointed Chairman of the War Supply Council, on which all British countries South and East of Suez were represented. During the War (November 1939) the Viceroy sent him to London to represent India in the Conference of Dominion Ministers called by British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to discuss the situation created by the War. While Zafarullah was still in London, the Viceroy directed him to lead a delegation to the League of Nations. The League session was called to discuss Finland’s complaint of aggression against the USSR. Zafarullah roundly and forcefully condemned the Russian aggression. Russia was expelled from the League. 22

During the War, Mirza Mahmud continued to put forth his dreams on its progress, particularly on the events where the Allies faced military reverses. He prayed for their success. Zafarullah says that Mirza Mahmud was, from time to time, vouchsafed knowledge of the progress of the war in advance, the military maneuverings in North Africa, the Allied landings on Sicily and Italy etc. Zafarullah kept the Viceroy informed of them who became keenly interested and some times inquired whether any fresh intimation had been received from the head of the movement.23

AG in China

In February 1942 General Chiang Kai Shek, the absolute ruler of China, came on an official visit to Delhi. Among other matters arranged between him and the Viceroy, it was also agreed that India should have direct diplomatic representation at Chungking, on the upper reaches of the Yangtze Kiang, where the capital of China had been pushed under the Japanese pressure. India’s representative would have the title of Agent General and the rank of Ambassador. 24

On March 1942 Viceroy Lord Linlithgo sent a letter to Zafarullah to accept the post of Agent-General in His Majestly’s Embassy in Chungking, China, retaining his position as puisine Judge of the Federal Court for a period of six months. The post will be in the nature of an heroic one, and there are few men whom I feel I could call with confidence to sustain it. The appointment of Agent General in China was meant to give it an impression that in India she had an ally who can give effective help in turning the table against Japan.25

Zafarullah served the Imperialist interest well in China. At the end of his six month term, Chiang Kai Sheik, in a letter dated 26 September 1942 addressed to Lord Linlithgo, the Viceroy of India, stated:

‘We are sorry to part with Sir Zafarullah Khan on both public and private grounds. During his comparatively short stay here he has been instrumental in drawing close both political and cultural ties between India and China.’ 26 The British Council General in Chungking also called Zafarullah ‘ the best representative of the British Empire it ever had with the Chinese, both from the point of view of the influence he exercised and from that of the direction of that influence.’ 27

Zafarullah sent his weekly political reports to the Political Secretary, Sir Olaf Caroe, on the activities of Communist leaders viz. Mao Tse Tung and Chou En Lai. On his return from China in October 1942 he informed the Viceroy that the Communists were Moscow trained and well organized in China. They would come to power after the defeat of Japan. The oppressed peasant looked to them as their saviours. 28

Zafarullah Recommends Ghulam Mohammad

On 4 August Zafarullah sent a personal and confidential letter to the Viceroy of India from China. He proposed the appointment of one more Muslim to the Viceroy’s Council. His proposal involved the following:
  1. On completion of the term of Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member Viceroy’s Executive Council, the vacancy is filled with M.S.Akbar Hydari;
  2. Consideration of the desirability of including Sir Mirza Ismail at suitable time.
  3. Failing (a) and (b) your Excellency might consider Mr. Ghulam Muhammad 29 till lately additional Secretary in the Supply Department and now Finance Member of H.E. the Nizam Government. Mr.Ghulam Muhammad is a comparatively young man but possesses great ability and drive and I think, would in practice fully justify his choice. 30
Sir Zafarullah in his letter also raised the question of prospective position of Indian Officers on the defense side in case any scheme emerges pertaining to the transfer of power. The Viceroy appreciated his point about Muslim representation and enclosed him a note of General Hartely, C-in-C Indian Army which was prepared by him for Lord Linlithgo on this subject. 31

Indianization of the Council

Before leaving China, Zafarullah also submitted a memorandum to the Viceroy on the constitutional problems of India. He proposed that the time had come when the entire Council should be composed of Indians and should function as Cabinet under a gentlemen’s agreement that the Secretary of State would not veto a decision of the Council except in a case which was likely to prejudice the security of India. The Viceroy forwarded the Memorandum to the Secretary of State for his views. The proposal was however dropped by the Government because Mahatma Gandhi resorted to hunger strike and two Hindu members of the Viceroy’s Executive Council resigned in sympathy with him.32

After the return from China, Zafarullah left for Canada to attend the Pacific Conference.

Pacific Conference

In late November 1942 the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Quebec (Canada). Zafarullah, Begum Shah Nawaz were appointed the members of the Indian Delegation. The discussions in the Conference were purely academic. None of the topics was of direct concern to India, and the deliberations of the Conference led to no practical results.33 The Conference was split up into four RTCS Eco, India, China, General or Political. Mr. Tarr, one of the Canadian representatives, was presiding at the RTC. Sir Zafarullah was president of the Eco RTC and Sir R. Mudaliar represented India at the India RTC. The Indian case was presented by Mr. Khanna in a strong and shocking manner. Begum Shah Nawaz ably put forth the Muslim case and explained the true state of political affairs prevailing in India. 34

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai was India’s Agent-General in the US. During Zafarullah’s stay in Washington he arranged his meeting with President Roosevelt of America. The US President told him that he could not pressurize Churchill, nevertheless he would not miss any opportunity to impress upon him the desirability of giving freedom to India. 35

During Zafarullah’s visit abroad, Lord Linlithgo, in a note, warned the Secretary of State for India, about his and Mudaliar’s activities regarding the issue of ‘marked degree of early constitutional advance and Indianization of services and High Court.' He explained that their motive behind the Indianization move was to secure a position for ‘their community, their friends or part of India.' 36 In December 1942 Spens became the new Chief Justice of India. Lord Linlithgo states:

‘There is in certain quarters a feeling of relief that the choice should not have fallen on Zafarullah who is thought to be moving into political field to a great extent not desirable for a judge. The Viceroy had the name of Varadachari as Indian Chief Justice and considered Zafarullah not ripe for the appointment.’ 37 In Washington, Zafarullah received a message from Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington, that the Secretary of State for India desired to see him in London for consultation. He arrived there in the first week of January 1943 and stayed on till the first week of March.

The Secretary of State writes to the Viceroy on 15 January 1943:

‘We had a Government lunch to Zafarullah on Wednesday, to which most of the War Cabinet and other Ministers came; how far induced by eagerness to see and hear Zafarullah (whom most of them already know) or by the prospects of solid food and even wine, I cannot say. Any how they were rewarded by an admirable little impromptu speech of Zafarullah, in which he touched lightly on the Indian situation, affirming his conviction that it was vital for India to stay in the British Commonwealth and that the danger of her going out would only arise if we appeared to be coercing her to stay in or to be going back on our promises.   'In a talk to me, he urged in general terms the importance of progressive Indianization not only in the Executive but also in Service, Judiciary etc. So as to have trained and moderate men available for India purposes and forestalls the places of Europeans being filled with ignorant and head swelled political retainers.

He wanted to do useful public work of one sort or another during the five months of a law vacation. The only thing he has suggested in that connection was that he might revisit the States and do what he found more effective than any thing else, namely, meet quietly small groups of the academic and professional classes whose opinion count a most in America.’ 38

 The Secretary of State, in another letter dated 20 January 1943 to Lord Linlithgo states that Zafarullah intends to form nucleus of a party of moderates who could throw weight effectively when the movement comes for the establishment of an Indian constitution and when Indian has to decide whether to stay in Commonwealth or not. 39

Zafarulla also gave a talk to the Empire Parliamentary Association in London on constitutional issue. He marked:

‘It would be disaster for India and for ourselves if the partnership between us were not maintained in face of new international conditions which would arise after the War: that there is no hope of any settlement between the parties during the War but that we should be wise to go forward boldly, rather than wait for agitation in bringing into effective partnership those who were prepared to look with us, and so training a body of responsible men who could exercise steadying influence afterwards.’40 Amrey, the Secretary of State for India, in a note to Lord Linlithgo (February, 1943) states that Zafarullah is ‘very keen on giving the whole of his spare time to working up the nucleus of a party of moderate men who wish to find a stable constitution for India to secure Indian future stability in the world by her remaining a member of the British Empire.’ [Private Secretary of the Viceroy remarks at the margin (I cannot find that it is consistent with the retention of judicature of their independence and hold on public confidence that a Federal Court Judge should become an active organizer in national and constitutional politics nor have I much faith in Zafarullah’s direction or knowledge of where to stop in a matter of that kind]. However, the Secretary of States sees no objection if he works at his own. ‘He is genuinely convinced of the necessity of India’s remaining with the Empire and that is equally the case with Mudaliar and Aziz ul Haq. 41 (Italic added).

Conciliation Appeal

After the failure of the Cripps Mission, the Congress passed the ‘Quit India’ resolution on 8 August 1942. Mahatma Gandhi was arrested and the Congress party was banned. The League declared the movement at attempt to coerce the British Government at hand-over to the Hindus the administration of the country. It did not take part in it.

Qadianis looked to the independence movement with awe. They out-rightly opposed the Muslim League’s policy. Mirza Mahmud called the establishment of Pakistan and the demand for an independence state ‘bonds to fasten Indian subjection.’ 42

In December 1944, Zafarullah, then the Judge Federal Court of India wrote a brief life sketch of Mirza Mahmud. While discussing his political ideas, he remarked:

‘He believes that India will attain its political, economic, and moral salvation through Islam and is, therefore, not a believer in any sectional scheme of Pakistan. He believes that in the end the whole of India will be Pakistan and therefore also Akhund Hindustan. He considers that the controversy to which these two conceptions have given rise will serve merely to prolong India’s subjection to British.’ 43 On 12 January 1945, Mirza Mahmud delivered an address to his community at Qadian on the British relations with India. He appealed both parties to come to terms: ‘Time has come for Britain to take Indians into confidence. It is the will of God that He has linked the world peace with the British. Despite a few shortcomings, God had endowed the British with outstanding qualities. How can we go against God’s commandment and turn away our eyes. We have always been extending cooperation to the Government especially to Britain because that is what we have learnt from the Quran. Even if we faced difficulties and were subjected to harm, we, in general, continued to cooperate with every Government. Now it was in the interest of England to come to an agreement with India. It is a source of strength for Britain, provides a large market, supplies manpower to the Army and in fact is a Jewel in the British Crown. That is why God had sent the Promised Messiah in India. India will, in near future, be under the sway of the Promised Messiah. No power on earth could keep Indians whether Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs away from coming into the fold of the Promised Messiah. 44 In the end he instructed his followers to take this message of love and mutual understanding to every nook and corner of India.

Commonwealth Conference

Sir Zafarullah gives his ‘role’ in the last phase of the struggle for independence of India. He led the Indian delegation of the Indian Institute of International Relations to the Commonwealth Relations Conference in Chatham House, St James Square, London, in the spring of 1945. He was still the Federal Court Judge at that time. At the opening sitting, he gave India’s contribution to the War efforts towards preserving the liberties of the nations of Commonwealth and safeguarding the peace of the world at the cost of its economic ruin. Then he discussed its constitutional crisis and concluded: ‘Statesmen of the Commonwealth, does it not strike you as an irony of the first magnitude that India should have two and a half million men in the field, fighting and struggling to preserve the liberties of the nations of the Commonwealth, and yet should be suppliant for her own freedom? How long do you think will she be prepared to wait? India is on the march. You may help her, or you may hinder her, but none shall stop her. India shall be free; within the Commonwealth, if you will let her and accord her the position that is justly her due; without the Commonwealth, if you will leave her no alternative.’ 45(Italics added) That was what the British public opinion maintained during those years, except perhaps a microscopic minority of diehards belonging to the school of Churchill. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to the Viceroy Wavell on 8 March 1945: Zafarullah’s ‘Main argument that under delay in setting India on her feet in one way or another will gravely prejudice the chance of her remaining in the Commonwealth, you and I do not differ from him on that point’46 As for the Interim constitution for India ‘I cannot think of better interim constitution for India, for the present constitution with such minor trimmings as will be involved bringing the legislature up-to-date and getting rid of the economic safeguards.’ 47

Zafarullah’s Constitutional Plan

Sir Zafarullah and Sir Sultan Ahmad gave their Constitutional Plans on Indian problem for consideration of the British Government in 1945. The Plan suggested by Zafarullah was circulated in the form of a memorandum (India Committee Paper) on 16 February 1945 along with the Plan of Sir Sultan Ahmad who afterwards became member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council. Their views on constitutional issues are given in the words of the secretary of State for India: ‘I circulate for information, a note in which Sir Zafarullah Khan gives his views on a possible means of solving the communal problem in the constitutional file. Sir Zafarullah was member of RTC and Joint Select Committee and subsequently the Viceroy’s Executive Council. He is now a Judge of the Federal Court and has come here as leader of the Indian delegation to the Commonwealth Relation Conference convened by the Institute of International Affairs. He has a very acute mind, is a Punjabi, who represents the moderate Muslim point of view, but unfortunately has little personal following as he belongs to an unorthodox sect.’ 48 Making a comparison of Sir Zafarullah’s plan with that of Sir Sultan Ahmad’s, the Secretary of State emphasizes: ‘The point of resemblance of Sir Zafarullah Khan and Sir Sultan Ahmad are more numerous and striking than the differences. Neither advocates Pakistan.(Italics added). Both recommend a Federal Center with strictly limited power, residuary power remaining with the units. They differ as to the units, Sir Sultan Ahmad contemplating a redrawing of boundaries and Sir Zafarullah Khan preferring to use the Existing provinces, leaving their boundaries unaltered for 25 years. Both stipulate, in varying degree, a minimum Muslim representation in the Federal Executive and the Federal Services. Sir Zafarullah claims 50% share in the Executive, Sir Sultan is content with 40% (coupled with 40% Hindus, 10% Depressed classes and 10% other). The latter, however, while content with the similar communal ratio in the Civil Services, demands 50% of the Defense Services. Sir Zafarullah thinks the Muslim would acquiesce in a 10% share of Defense Services and one-third representation in the Civil Service. In one respect or other these commercial claims would be contested by the Hindus, who would also be opposed to the conception of weak Center. Sir Zafarullah makes no reference to the possibility of an interim reconstruction of the present Government of India. Sir Sultan Ahmad definitely recommends the drafting of new India Constitution should precede the setting up of provisional Government.’ 49 Sir Zafarullah scheme came under discussion in London specially its aspect of future constitution framing in the wake of arriving at an agreed constitution by political parties of India. Zafarullah thought Indians would fail to come to an agreement and the Government had to give its own solution within the framework of Act of 1935, working towards a loose federation. 50

Wavell Plan

Gandhi was released from jail in July 1944. He opened negotiation with the Viceroy, but those bore no fruit. Gandhi-Jinnah correspondence did not help arrive at a settlement of leading political issues either. The British Government invited Lord Wavell to London for consultation. Prior to the announcement of Wavell Plan, Sir Zafarullah went to London. Sir J Colville, Acting Governor General of India, wrote to Amery, Secretary of State for India on 22 May 1945: ‘You have no doubt seen Abell’s (Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy) telegram to Turnball (Private Secretary to the Secretary of State), about Zafarullah’s journey to UK. It is strongly suspected here that he has gone for political purpose and, both Spens (Chief Justice of India) and I are annoyed with him… Although Zafarullah spokes as a nationalist when he was last in London and obtained a good deal of applause from the nationalist press out here, I suppose that he and (Sir) Feroz (Noon) 51 may both have gone to London in the hope of preventing any constitutional proposal being accepted which might be unwelcome to them.’ 52 Wavell returned to India with a formula for Independence of India and announced his scheme on 12 June 1945. He held a Conference at Simla with the leaders of the Congress and the League to break the deadlock and to secure the cooperation of principal Indian political parties in the successful conclusion of the War against Japan by selecting the members of the Executive Council from amongst leaders of Indian political life at the Center and in the provinces, in proportions which would give a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Muslims and caste Hindus. This plan failed because the League insisted that nomination of all Muslims representatives should proceed from itself which, Wavell did not concede.

On 22 June 1945 Mirza Mahmud in his Friday address welcomed the plan and urged Indian political leaders to accept it without further consideration and delay.

He emphasized that its acceptance would help to arrive at an agreement with the British and in this way the political leaders would not only do a great favour to themselves but also to their coming generations.53 He criticized the political leaders who were disputing with each other over matters of details when Britain had announced to bestow independence upon India. 54 An English version of his address was placed in the hands of Muslim and non Muslim political leaders who had been invited by Lord Wavell to the Conference in Simla. The Conference failed and no amicable settlement could be reached between the League and Congress leaders.

Elections 1945-46

With the termination of the War (1945-46) the Labour Government of Attlee announced election schedule. Elections were held in India during the winter of 1945-46.

Muslim League has been taking the shape of a sole representative body of Muslims of India under the dynamic leadership of Quaid-e-Azam. Qadianis were well aware of it. Mirza Mahmud, a notorious political opportunist of his time, planned to seize the opportunity. On 21 October 1945 he wrote an article under the caption: The Policy of Jama'at Ahmadiyya in the Coming Elections and instructed his community to support the Muslim League. It is very interesting that in that very article he opposed Pakistan scheme, the very basis on which the League carried out his election campaign.

He writes:

By that time (Simla Conference, 1945) I decided that unless there was a change in circumstances, we should support the Muslim League or its policy. Although we now, as well as in the past, firmly and whole-heartedly believed in Akhund Hindustan which could easily contain the Muslim Pakistan and the Hindu Hindustan. WE still strictly adhere to it. 55 Qadians were an insignificant minority in whole of India. Moreover, they were scattered and could only exert a little influence on election results. They could claim some influence in their birth place i.e. Punjab.56 According to Mirza Mahmud, Qadiani numbered 4 to 5 lac in all. Out of this only about 50,000 were legible to cast votes. There were nearly six thousand Qadiani voters in the Punjab mainly concentrated in Sialkot, Wazirabad, Shakargarh and Batala Tehsils. Keeping in view their voting strength, Qadiani support for Muslim League, Unionists or any other political party had no meaning at all. No political party was willing to cooperate with them for fear of inviting the wrath of Muslims who had been striving hard to assert their Islamic identity in the forthcoming elections. Mirza Mahmud explained the difficulties being faced by Ahmadiyya Jama'at in the wake of coming elections to his inner Cabinet and emphasized the need of certain mutual understanding between the heads of local Jama'ats and candidates taking part in elections. He lamented that Muslim League, the Unionist Party, and the Zamindara League had not given party ticket to Ahmadi candidates. He claimed that the political parties were only expressing their support for certain individual candidates in lieu of support in other constituencies as Unionist would support Nawab Muhammad Din (Sialkot) and Chaudhry Anwar Hussain (Ajnala) and Muslim League would extend cooperation to Abdul Ghafoor Qamar (Shakargarh). That had led to a paradoxical situation that Muslim Leaguers and Unionists were strongly opposing Ahmadis in some local constituencies but cooperating with them in some others. He advised his community to be ready to adjust themselves to the changed policy of Qadian for the interest of Ahmadiyyat.57

It may be stated here that the League leadership considered Qadianism, a heresy, and Qadianis, a non-Muslim entity. Maulana Abdul Hamid Badayuni, one time made an attempt to move a resolution in the Lahore Session of the Muslim League on 30 July 1944 to debar Qadianis from getting the League’s membership but was not allowed to do so on political reasons. Mirza Mahmud also tried to get an authoritative verdict from the Muslim League leadership in favour of Qadianism, but failed. He deputed Pir Akbar Ali to discuss the issue with some senior members of the League but he received a strong rebuff from them. On 28 January 1946 Qadian formally announced its support for the Punjab Assembly candidates in the coming elections. There were 27 Muslim League candidates58, 16 Unionists,59 3 independents 60 and one Zamindara League nominee61. In Joint Electorate seats, support was announced for Malik Khizar Hayat, Unionist, (Landlord Multan and West Punjab) and Sardar Jagjit Singh Maan (Landlord Central).61

By early February, Qadian announced its so-called support for some more candidates. It included 4 Muslim Leaguers,62 10 Unionists63 and one independent candidate,64 a Qadiani lawyer. Mirza Mahmud, a notorious opportunist of his time, had no set principles to observe. He jumped into elections fray to reap prospective benefits for his community. His announcement of ‘support’ for Muslim League was a farce and the worst kind of opportunism, which had always been the hallmark of Qadian.65 Contrary to the flimsy verbal support for the League’s candidates in some Punjab constituencies which they certainly did not require at all, Qadianis simultaneously launched a propaganda campaign against many League nominees in other constituencies in collaboration with Unionists and independents. It brought a good deal of embarrassment to political workers of the League and they faced difficulties in running their election campaign smoothly.

Moreover the support announced for different candidates by the Center and local Jama'ats at the same time led to confusion. In some cases, the local Jama'ats disregarded instruction from the Center to support the candidates of their choice.66 Its classic example was the Ahmadi voters of Gujranwala constituency. They did not obey Mirza Mahmud’s order and continued to support the candidates of their choice. Mirza Mahmud had to announce with indignation that they were free to vote to the candidates of their choice but imposed a penalty of suspension of their representation in Majlisi Shoora (Advisory Body) and ordered that no Ahmadi from Gujranwala could see him in future.67

In Narowa constituency, Qadianis supported their Ahmadi candidate Khan Bahadur Nawab Muhammad Din who was a Unionist nominee against Mian Mumtaz Daultana, the League nominee. Similarly in Sialkot Deska constituency support was first announced for Unionist candidate Zaildar Ghulam Jilani against the League nominee, Chaudhary Nasiruddhin. Afterwards it was changed and an avowed Ahrari leader Shibzada Faizul Hasan of Alo Mohar who was a Unionist nominee was supported. Sir Zafarullah, then Judge, Federal Court of India and Khan Bahadur Qasim Ali of Daska brought him to Qadian in January 1946 to conclude a deal with him.68 Mirza Mahmud came to an understanding with him and ordered his Jama'at to vote for him. The announcement in AlFazl brought a good deal of astonishment to the people and many Qadianis sought its clarification time and again. It was unbelievable to them.

In Bhalwal constituency Mirza Mahmud announced support for a Unionist candidate. An influential landlord of the area, Malik Sahib Khan Noon, an Ahmadi, made a firm commitment of support to that candidate on the basis of assurances given by Mirza Mahmud. Seeing his chances of success bleak, Mirza Mahmud declared ‘support’ for Sheikh Fazal Haq Piracha (Muslim League) but instructed Malik Noon to continue his support for the Unionist candidate. 69

To meet the imperatives of its ever changing policy on elections, Mirza Mahmud advised the local Ahmadiyya Jama'ats of Hasar, Rohtek, Gurgaon, Karnal, Mianwali, Jhang and Rawalpindi to arrive at some understanding on the basis of majority decisions for extending support to selected candidates. 70 In most cases, the Unionist candidates were supported in these constituencies in accordance with the undeclared policy of Qadian. Qadian’s main interest laid in the election of Batala constituency of the Punjab where Fateh Muhammad Sayal, an independent Qadiani candidate and a blue-eyed boy of Mirza Mahmud, was contesting against Mian Badar Mohyuddin (Unionist) and Syed Bahuddin (Muslim League) with active support of non Muslim feudal aristocracy and indirect British patronage. He won the seat. On his success Mirza Bashir Ahmad extended special thanks to his Sikh and Hindu supporters who ‘helped Ahmadi candidate by putting themselves in numerous difficulties’ 71 Mirza Mahmud made it clear that the real task of his Ahmadi member of the Punjab Assembly was to work in a way that Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs could come to an agreement with one another and all of them work together for the development of the province,72 a policy professed by the Unionist Party.

In Lyallpur constituency, Ch. Ismar Ullah Qadiani contested against the League nominee and received a crushing defeat. It unequivocally established that the Qadiani declaration for the support of the Muslim League was an eyewash. It was a unilateral declaration meant only to hoodwink public opinion and to camouflage their odd deals. In many instances it proved harmful to the League’s slogan of establishment of an Islamic State of Pakistan. The pro-Congress nationalist elements exploited the situation to their advantage. A wild and malicious propaganda campaign was openly launched against as many as 16 Ahrar or pro-Ahrar candidates 73 engaged in contesting the Punjab Elections. 74

The Ahrars were routed in these elections and lost their popularity. It afforded an opportunity to Qadiani activists to discredit and defame their archenemies. Large funds flowed from Qadian for character assassination campaign of Ahrar leaders. Qadianis directed their efforts to fulfill a prophecy of Mirza Mahmud i.e. 'Ahrars would find the ground slipping from under their feet’ which related to their sudden downfall. AlFazl was jubilant over their total defeat in the elections. 75

The Punjab Elections brought very interesting things to the notice of Muslims:

  1. Despite tall claim of Mirza Mahmud of extending so-called support to certain candidates some Qadiani elders openly disregarded ‘His Holiness’ orders and continued to support candidates of their own choice. They received money and official support to conduct the election campaign of the Unionists and exploited the evasive policy of Qadian for their personal ends. Mirza Mahmud deplored this state of affairs in his addresses.76 Even in those constituencies where local Jama'ats made majority decisions and approval of the Center was accorded to them, Qadiani voters disregarded all instructions and voted for the candidates of their choice. 77
  2. Many Qadianis disliked the way Mirza Mahmud was engaged in conducting the Punjab election campaign. Support to an Ahrar leader Sahibzada FaizulHasan in place of Zaildar Ghulam Jilani, whose support was announced earlier by Qadiani, came under sharp attack.78 It was regarded a shortsighted policy and undue submission to the whims and wishes of Sir Zafarullah and Malik Khizar Hayat.
  3. Continuously shifting loyalties and undeclared support to certain candidates by flouting mutual agreements exposed Qadian. It became clear that Mirza Mahmud was undoubtedly a master of dirty tricks, a pseudo politician and a self-seeker.
In post elections days Qadian echoed with the voice of dissidents. It was alleged that the hard-earned money of Ahmadis, given for the propagation of their beliefs, had been lavishly spent on politicking. 79 Mirza Mahmud was quick to stifle those voices through his autocratic ways with the support of his mercenaries.

In the Provincial Assemblies, the Congress secured majority in Hindu dominated provinces as well as in Assam and the NWFP. The League captured 428 out of 492 seats reserved for the Muslims in all Provincial Assemblies. It formed ministries in Bengal and in Sindh but not in the Punjab where a coalition of the Unionists, Akali Sikhs and the Congress assumed office under Sardar Khizar Hayat. The party position in the Punjab Assembly was the Muslim League (73) and the Unionists (12) Later on four Unionists joined the League.

After the elections, Qadian made a perfidious announcement that they had extended ‘support’ to 33 members of the Muslim League out of which 32 succeeded and 9 Unionist candidates were supported in the Punjab elections out of which 6 were successful. 80 They, in fact extended self proclaimed support to 31 Muslim Leaguers, 26 Unionists, independents and one Zamindara League nominee. In practice their deceptive policy was heavily tilted towards Unionists and announcements and declarations of their cooperation with the Muslim League were devoid of any substance.

In the Central Assembly, the League won every seat reserved for the Muslims, while the Congress captured the remaining elective seats. Qadianis cast their votes in favour of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, the Muslim League candidate for Central Assembly seat. They were left with no other choice. Mirza Mahmud also instructed Ahmadis of Bengal, UP, Behar, CP, Bombay, NWFP etc. to vote for Muslim league. It was rhetorical strategy to conceal political dichotomy pursued by him since the fall of 1945.

Nehru Supports Zafarullah

Relations between Qadianis and the Congress leaders were very cordial in the last phase of the independence movement. Pandit Nehru proposed the name of Sir Zafarullah from British India for the Presidentship of International Court of Justice. The British Government fully supported him. The UK Nationalist Group also nominated him as one of the four candidates on the UK list. But American Delegation to the UN withdrew its supports at the last moment infavour of a Polish candidate and he could not succeed in the contest. Nehru also had in mind his name as future Chief Justice of India. 81

Cabinet Mission

It was announced in the British Parliament on 19 February 1946 that a 3-man Cabinet Mission would visit India to find a solution to the Indian problem. The Mission arrived at Delhi on 24 March 1946. It held prolonged discussions with the leaders of Indian parties to produce an agreed solution.

On 5 April 1946 Mirza Mahmud wrote an article in AlFazl, Qadian under the title: Parliamentary Mission and Duty of Indians in which he stated:

‘Many Ahmadis have asked me shy the members of the Mission had not given an opportunity to Ahmadis to explain their point of view? My reply is (a) we are a religious and not a political organization. Still the Commission has provided an opportunity to Organizations of Christians to give their point of view. (b) We and Muslims will be in the same boat. (c) We are a minority. Anyhow we have been making far greater sacrifices in the War as compared with other organizations of India.’ 82 He emphatically brought to the notice of the Mission that Britain could be guilty if it created a situation where a minority could not get its due rights. He concluded with a note that Hindu Muslim issue could be solved in a just way. He had always been a protagonist of the principle of the British Empire and believed it to be far superior to the then established International League or the UNO. The system might require a change but it could not be called a subjection to the foreign rule if we shared with it. However, ultimately there should be a mutual agreement among different parts of India and with that of the British Empire, he maintained.

On the basis of that agreement Hindus and Muslims could live together as they had been living in the past hundreds of years. He assured the Hindus that his heart was with them and he eagerly desired a mutual agreement between them and Muslims of India so that these stepbrothers could live like real brothers. He finally remarked:

‘I firmly believe that every possible effort must be made to keep India united. Had there been a separation it would not have been a real one and should ultimately result in the unity of India.’ (Italics added) 83 This article was given the shape of tract and was sent to Maulana Azad, Mahatma Gandhi and the Quaid. It was also circulated in the Muslim Convention, Delhi and the public meeting organized by the Muslim League at the Urdu Park, Delhi. 84

Provisional Government

On 12 August 1946 Lord Wavell invited the Congress President Pandit Nehru to form a Provisional Government with the League, if possible. The Quaid refused to join the Cabinet on the plea that the Cabinet Mission Plan had been accepted by the League and rejected by the Congress. Logically, therefore, the Muslim League should have been called upon to form an Interim Government. The League, therefore, decided to pass a resolution for direct action and condemned the Congress and the British for the breach of faith with the Muslim. Direct Action Day was observed on 16 August.

On 2 August, Mirza Mahmud advised the Muslim League to change its present complexion of being sole representative party of the Muslims and turn itself into the National League by bringing in its fold some non-Muslim communities like Parsees, Sikhs and Christians. The League was proposed to adopt a flexible attitude to accommodate other organizations, 85 and prove itself a political and not a religious party. It was obviously an attempt to find place for Qadianis in the League.

Qadianis came out with their criticism and condemnation of the Direct Action Programme on the ground that ‘Ahmadis were not bound to accept it as it went contrary to their religious beliefs and there was no obligation on their part as the League had not entered into any alliance with them.’ 86

In late August 1946, Mirza Mahmud instructed Bashir Ahmad, Advocate Lahore, to revive the activities of its paramilitary organization, the National League, to play its due role in the then prevailing circumstances. 87 The object was to provide support to the British Government to meet Direct Action threat and save Ahmadis from militant attacks. Qadianis were already very active in detecting INA ‘spies’ and had set up their well-knit espionage system as an arm of the British Intelligence in India and the Far East especially in Japan.

Delhi Plan

The Government formed by Pandit Nehru took office on 2 September, 1946. The League refused to participate in the Interim Government. AlFazl wrote that ‘the Congress had not taken a wise step, it should have taken Muslims into confidence for a Hindu-Muslim rapprochement.’88

On 23 September 1946 Mirza Mahmud left for Delhi on a political mission. He was accompanied by Mirza Bashir Ahmad, A.R.Dard, Dr Hashmatullah, Mirza Sharif Ahmad, Ch.Asadullah, (brother of Sir Zafarullah), Zulfiqar Ali, Ch Muzafar Din, and Sufi Abdul Qadeer. He met the leading political leaders viz. the Quaid, Gandhi, Azad, Nawab Bhopal, Nehru, besides some foreign journalists. He wished to see the Viceroy but was not able to do so due to his prior commitments. He, however, sent him a few letters explaining his point of view on the then prevailing political deadlock. He was urging the British to keep in view the future of Ahmadi loyalists while transferring power to the Congress and the League. A.R Dard called on the Private Secretary to the Viceroy and handed him a letter from Mirza Mahmud. 89

In late 1946, AlFazl emphatically urged on Ahmadis to do their utmost to bring Muslims into the fold of Ahmadiyyat. Minimum target fixed for every Ahmadi was to make one convert.90 AlFazl also made Qadianis understand in the customary way that God had already decided to create a new heaven and earth for Ahmadiyya Community through His Promised Messiah and His Caliphs and Jama'at.91 It alluded to the establishment of Qadiani State in some part of India.

Mirza Mahmud also met Khan Bahadur Ali Quli Khan, former Political Agent NWFP. Nawab Chattari, a former Governor of UP, sent a telegram from Aligarh expressing his cooperation and appreciation for his ‘Mission.’ Sir Agha Khan sent him a similar telegram from Europe.92 One special aspect of his visit to Delhi was his secret meetings with the officials of the British Intelligence. This is ‘confirmed’ from a top-secret letter, which was written by the Punjab Intelligence Chief to the Chief of the British Secret Service, London on 8 July 1947. We will refer to it later on.

In its September 1946 issue, AlFazl urged the Muslim League leadership to send a common appeal to Hazrat Imam Jama'at Ahmadiyya, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, requesting him to give advice on political issues like Direct Action. Through his leadership, Muslims could get their political rights without shedding blood and creating unrest in country. The paper made it clear that the proposal had been made in good faith. Any how, it was destined that ‘Jama'at Ahmadiyya must have a special position by the year 1948, as stated by its Imam (Mirza Mahmud).’93 The nature of Mirza Mahmud’s mission and his desire to find place for Qadiani Community in the Muslim League can be seen from his letter which he wrote to Mr. M.A. Jinnah on 6 October 1946 from Delhi on the induction of the League in the Interim Government by the British.

Following is the text of the letter. 94

"I am very glad to hear that after all the present negotiations are nearing a settlement. I have all along been of the opinion that though we should never loose sight of our ideal or slacken our struggle for it, we should at the same time be ready to accept a compromise (for Islam allows compromise on such occasions) provided it is honorable and leaves us free to continue lawful struggle for further achievement. This is what is popularly known as accepting a thing under protest. As the Interim Government has immense power for good and evil, I was naturally very anxious that some way might be found for the Muslims to get in and I am glad that your good handling of the situation and cooperation of influential friends have made that possible.

If no further hitch crops up and a settlement is finally reached, which we could hope and pray for, I would draw your attention to the great need of strengthen and expanding the organization of the Muslim League. To begin with five things seem to be essential:

 There is, of course, a very vast field of work but even if a modest beginning is made the foundation will be laid for future progress and prosperity. May God help you!

The expanded organization will be beneficial in another way also. There is at present a fairly large number of capable Muslims who are ready or rather eager to serve the cause of Islam and Muslims in India. The expanded organization will open the door for absorbing them; otherwise they might become gradually alienated and even discontented and some of them may eventually turnout to be a source of mischief.

I did not perhaps inform you that the very day I met you, I sent a note to H.E. the Viceroy telling him that the Muslim League demands had the full sympathy and support of my community." 95

 Mirza Mahmud’s sole purpose of visit to Delhi was to find some place for his Jama'at. He could neither influence the Congress leadership nor the League had any soft corner for him. He claimed that through his prayers the hearts of the leaders of political parties had melted and they came to an understanding on the question of interim government. Qadianis claim that Mirza Mahmud was instrumental in creating a situation in consultation with Mr. Jinnah and with the cooperation and assistance of His Highness the Nawab of Bhopal, in which the way was opened for the Muslim League to be invited to join the interim Government on terms acceptable to Mr.Jinnah.96 It is totally untrue. It can neither be substantiated from Ahmadiyya record nor from other independent sources. Mirza Mahmud himself admits that Gandhi and Nehru were not prepared to listen to him nor gave least value to his (self-styled) mediation move.97 All credit goes to Nawab of Bhopal for his selfless efforts.98 In October 1946 the League finally consented, at the Viceroy’s persuasion, to join the Interim Government to safeguard the Muslim interests. But it refused to enter the Constituent Assembly provided by the Cabinet Mission Plan till such time as the Congress accepted the Plan unequivocally, unreservedly and in toto. A hastily called conference of the three parties, the Congress, the League and Akali Dal in London did not make much headway.

By the close of 1946, communal riots broke out in Bengal, Bihar and the Punjab. The Interim Government was heading towards failure. The Congress set about pulling wires in India and London and succeeded in securing the withdrawal of the Viceroy. A time limit was set for the withdrawal from India by the British Government (June 1948) and Lord Mountebattan arrived in India as the new Viceroy to work out the details of the transfer of power.

On 13 October 1946 the Muslim League decided to join the Interim Government and the next day Mirza Mahmud Ahmad left for Qadian. He gave the details of his visit to Delhi in an address to his community, which throws light on his political aspirations:

"No doubt it is the duty of the Government to consult us and take care of our rights. We are 7 to 8 lacs in number in India but are scattered in such a way that our voice is unheard. The League does not entertain our participation while we do not want to join the Congress. On the other hand, Parsees are only 3 lacs in number and the Government has taken a Parsee Minister in the Central Government. Their community has also been given official recognition while we are twice in number and even greater than that. I told a British officer in Delhi, although we do not complain, yet the Government has taken an unjust decision. They have recognized the political entity of Parsees but not of Ahmadis. I challenged him that I could produce two Ahmadis against each Parsee. Since our Jama'at does not agitate and keep silent that is why its right are not protected. Also my representative gave a reply to him that no doubt Ahmadis were a religious community but they had to live in India and were affected by the political conditions of the country. Another answer to that could be that Parsees and Christains were also religious communities and they had been given representation on religious and not on political grounds … we are scattered all over India and that is the reason we could not get one tenth of our due rights." 99 Had Ahmadis adopted a clear-cut policy by calling themselves a non-Muslim minority like Parsees, their political rights would have been much safer in free states!

The Qadiani opportunist, Mirza Mahmud also wrote another letter to Mr. M.A. Jinnah on 27 October 1946 from Qadian on the League’s acceptance of portfolios in the Interim Government:
'The new allotment of Portfolios has been announced. Though their distribution is not equitable yet I must congratulate you on your successful efforts. The important portfolios like Defense, External Affairs, Home etc. are still with the Congress. One of them especially the Defense or the Supply ought to have been given to the Muslim League. However the Muslim League representatives will follow your advice and work assiduously till the rights of Muslims are fully secured. May Allah help you in your great task and lead you to the right path, Amen! 100

References

  1. Farooq Qadian, 14 September, 1939
  2. Sir Zafarulla, Ahmadiyyat, P.286-287
  3. Mirza Mahmud The New World Order of Islam, A Tabshir Publication, Rabwah, 1969 P.36 (English version of an address delivered to the Ahmadiyya Annual gathering at Qadian 28 December, 1942 translated by sir Zafarullah)
  4. J.D.Shams and M.Yaqub, Guzashta was Maujoda Jang Kay Motalak Paishgoyian, London, 1943
  5. Zafarullah, Ahamadyat, P. 288 4 . AlFazl Qadian 13 September, 1939
  6. Seerat-i -Mirza Sharif Ahmad, comiled by Ch.Abdul Aziz, Majlis Khudam-e-Ahmadiyya,Rabwah 1962,P.136
  7. AlFazl Qadian, 9 march, 1939
  8. A list of 200 Qadiani officers is given in the Ahmadiyya Memorandum to the Boundary Commission(1947) Partition of the Punjab, Vol 1, Lahore, 1984
  9. Alfazal Qadian, 9 March, 1946
  10. Wali Khan’s book was serialized by the daily Frontier Post, Peshawar and was subsequently published in 1987 in a book form under the title ‘Facts Are Facts.’
  11. Text of note in the Pakistan Times, Lahore, 13 February 1982
  12. Chattan Lahore, 21 December, 1981
  13. Pakistan Time Rawalpindi, 13 February, 1982
  14. Pakistan time Rawalpindi, 13 February. 1982
  15. Lord Linlithgo’s Papers, India Office Library, London quoted by the weekly Mayar Karachi, 7-13 January, 1984
  16. Ibid
  17. Ibid
  18. K.K.Aziz, Britain and Pakistan, University of Islamabad Press, 1976, P.28
  19. Farooq Qadian, 28 march, 1940
  20. Sir Zafarullah, The Agony of Pakistan, London, P.20
  21. Sir Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.110
  22. Ibid, P.111
  23. Sir Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.115
  24. The Transfer of Power, Vol I. P. 483 and P.593
  25. The Transfer of Power Vol III P. 48
  26. The Transfer of Powers, Vol VIII P. 783
  27. Sir Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.121
  28. Subsequently became the notorious Governor-General of Pakistan
  29. Zafarullah’s Letter to Lord Linlithgo, 4 August, 1942, The Transfer of Poser Vol. II P.562
  30. The Transfer of Power, Vol II P.834
  31. Sir Zafarullah, The Agony of Pakistan, P20
  32. Sir Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.125
  33. Jehan Ara Shah Nawaz, Father and Daughter, Lahore, 1971, P.184
  34. Sir Zafarullah, Tahdith P 450
  35. The Transfer of Power, Vol III P.407
  36. Linlithgo to Amrey, 8 December, 1942 The Transfer of Power, Vol III P.352
  37. The Transfer of Power, Vol III P.512
  38. Ibid
  39. Ibid P.526
  40. Amrey to Linlithgo 26 February, 1943, The Transfer of Power, Vol III P.738
  41. AlFazl Qadian, 11 June, 1944
  42. Sir Zafarullah, The Head of Ahmadiyya Movement, Baker and Witt Ltd, London, P.26
  43. AlFazl Qadian, 17 January, 1945
  44. Sir Zafarullah, The Agony of Pakistan, P.23
  45. Transfern of Power, Vol V.P.669
  46. Ibid
  47. The Transfer of Power, Vol V, P.550
  48. The Transfer of Power, Vol V. P. 551
  49. Ibid Vol. V. P. 702
  50. Sir Feroz Khan Noon was Defense Minister in the Viceroy’s Council. In 1944 he was sent to London along with the Maharaja of Kahsmir to represent British India on the war Cabinet. The maharaja represented the Princely States.(See Sir Feroz Khan Noon, From Memory, Lahore, 1966,P.180)
  51. The Transfer of Power, Vol V,P.1056
  52. Tarkh Ahmadiyyat, Vol X, P.263
  53. Ibid
  54. Tarikh-e-Ahmadiyyat Vol.X,P.276
  55. AlFazl Qadian, 13 November, 1946
  56. AlFazl Qadian, 29 January 1946
  57. [A] URBAN 1. Khawaja Ghulam Samad (S-Urban) 2. Sardar Shaukat Hayat (S-E) 3. Malik Barkat Ali (E-Urban)4. Karamat Ali (N-E) 5. Sir Feroz Khan Noon (Rawalpindi) 6. Sheikh Muhammad Amin (Multan) 7.Malik Wazir Muhammad (Lahore) 8. Begum Tasadaq Hussain (lahore) 9. Muhammad Rafique (Lahore) 10.Begum Shah Nawaz (Lahore) 11. Sheikh Sadiq hassan(Amritsar) RURAL: 12 Ch. Ali Akbar (Kangra and Hoshiarpur East) 13.Muhammad Salam (Jallunder) 14. Nawab Iftikhar Hussain Mamdot (Ferozpur) 15. Mian Iftikharuddin (Qasu) 16.Ch Ghulam farid (Gurdaspur) 17.Ch. Muhammad Hussain(Sheikhaupura) 18.K.Broshan Din(Shahdara)19. Rana Abdul Hamid (Pak Patten) 20.Ch.Fazal Illahi (Gujrat) 21. Ch.Bahawal Bux(Gujarat) 22. Sardar Bahadur Khan (D.G.Khan) 23. Ghulam Jilani Gurmani (Lieh) 24.Syed Budhan Shah(Khanewal) 25. Abdul Hamid (Muzaffar Garh) 26. Ch. Jehan Khan (Gujarat) and 27. Ghulam Rasul Trar (Gujrat)
  58. 1. Sardar Khizar Hayar (Multan and West Punjab) 2. Rao Muhammad Amroa Khan (Ambala and Simla) 3. SirMuzaffar Ali Qaizalbash (Lahore) 4. Sardar Habibullah Khan(Choonian) 5. Ch.Abdul Rahim ý(Shakargam) 6.Ch.Anwar Hussain (Anjala) 7. Ch.Ghulam Jilani (sialkot) 8. Nawab Muhammad Din Qadiani (Narowal)9. Ch.Ghulam Muhammad (Hafizbad) 10. Ch.Hussain Ali (Nankana) 11.Nawabazada Asghar Ali (Gujrat) 12. Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana (Khushab) 13. Raja Yaqub Khan (Pind Dadan Khan) 14. Malik Fateh Sher Langeryal (Montgomery) 15. Sh.Faiz Muhammad (D.G.Khan) 16. M.Ibrahim Burq (Ali Pur)
  59. Pir Akbar Ali (Ferozpur), Major Raja Abdulla (Wazirabad) and Fateh Muhammad Sayal, Balala Qadian
  60. Ch.Noor Khan Zaildar (Chakwal)
  61. AlFazl Qadian, 28 January 1946 2. Sardar Nasrulla Khan (Alipur )
  62. 1. Sheikh Fazal Haq Piracha (Bhalwal) 2. Sardar Nasrulla Khan (Alipur) 3. Mian Abdul Haq(Okara)4.Wali Muhammad Goheer (Nikodar/Philor)
  63. Nawab Allah Bux Tiwana (Sargodha)2.Rana Muhammad Hussain (Hoshiarpur)3. Syed Hussain Shah Gardezi (Kabirwala)4. Malik Muhammad Nawaz(Lodhran) 5. Syed Nasiruddin Shah(Toba Tek Singh) 6.Malik Rab Nawaz Tiwana (Lyallpur 7. Sahibzada Faizul Hasan of Alo Mohar (Deska) 8. Raja Khair Medhi(Jehlum) 9. Sir Nawab Makhdoom Hussain Qureshi (Ludhiana) 10. Rai Muhammad Iqbal (Ludhiana)
  64. Chaudhry Ismatullah (Lyallpur) See AlFazl Qadian, 29 January to 3 February, 1946
  65. Paigham-I-Sulh, Lahore, 27 February 1946
  66. AlFazl Qadian, 20 March, 1946
  67. AlFazl Qadian, 26 January, 1946
  68. AlFazl Qadian 20, March 1946
  69. Ibid
  70. AlFazl Qadian, 1st February1946
  71. AlFazl Qadiani 22nd February 1946
  72. AlFazl Qadiani 1st March 1946
  73. 1.Sh.Hussamuddin (Amritsar) 2.Master Tajuddin Ansari (Urban) 3. Mian Abdul Nabi (Urban) 4. Mazhar Ali Azhar (Urban) Sialkot 5. Molvi Mehar Nawaz (Multan) 6. Ghulam Farid (Gurdaspur) 7. Ch.Abdul Rahman(Jallunder) 8.Ch.Muhammad Abdullah (Narowal) 9. Kazim Ali (Khanewal) 10. Nasrullah Khan (Muzaffaragarh) 11. Abdul Hye (Attock) 12. Khushi Muhammad (Smundari) 13. Abdul Ghafoor (Toba tek Singh) 14. Muhammad Ali (Jallendhar) 15. Faiz Muhammad Khan (Alipur) and 16. Sardar Muhammad Shafi (Choonian)
  74. For the Ahrar point of view on Pakistan and other communal issues see Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, Hamaray Firqawarana Faisalay Ka Istadraj, Lahore, 1946
  75. Afazl Qadiani, 26 February,1946
  76. AlFazl Qadian, 20 March, 1946
  77. Ibid
  78. AlFazl Qadian, 31 January, 1946
  79. AlFazl Qadian, 20 march, 1946
  80. AlFazl Qadian, 28 February 1946
  81. Sir Zafarulla, Tahdith-I-Naimat
  82. AlFazl Qadian, 6 April 1946
  83. Tarikh Vol X P.380 Also AlFazl Qadian, 6 April 1946
  84. AlFazl Qadian, 16 April, 1946
  85. AlFazl Qadian, 2 August, 1946
  86. AlFazl Qadian, 19 September, 1946
  87. AlFazl Qadian, 2 September, 1946
  88. AlFazl Qadian, 4 September, 1946
  89. AlFazl Qadian, 4 September, 1946
  90. AlFazl Qadian, 4 September, 1946
  91. Ibid
  92. AlFazl Qadian, 5 October, 1946
  93. AlFazl Qadian, 19 September, 1946
  94. Tarikh-I- Ahmadiyyat, Vol, X Appendix
  95. Tarikh-I-Ahmadiyyat, Vol. XI Appendix
  96. Sir Zafarullah, Ahmadiyyat P.244
  97. AlFazl Qadian, 19 May, 1947
  98. AlFazl Qadian, 13 November, 1946
  99. AlFazl Qadian, 13 November, 1946
  100. Tarikh-e-Ahmadiyyat Vol. XI Appendix