Anti Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam
23rd February 14, 1999

Chapter 17


In accordance with a pre-conceived plan, Mirza Mahmud proposed to leave Qadian on 31 August 1947. In an address to his community he explained that when he saw a revelation of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad which he said to have received on 18 September 1894, he made a firm decision to migrate. It says ‘Dagh e Hijrat’ (The Stigma of Migration) and said to have a reference to migration of Ahmadis from Qadian. The events took a sharp turn in August 1947 and a British Army Colonel told Mirza Mahmud that the Muslims would be in great distress in Punjab after 31 August 1947. 1

Ahmad In Pakistan

Leaving Qadian under fire and terror, Mirza Mahmud planned to go to Lahore in military jeep to be provided by Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmad, the same fellow who was subsequently involved in the Pindi Conspiracy case. Due to non-availability of the said jeep, he took his son’s car and escorted by Cap. Attaullah arrived in Lahore along with his wife and daughter-in-law. He narrated the whole incident of his migration from Qadian to Lahore in a Friday sermon: "When a study of the revelations vouchsafed to the Promised Messiah convinced me that our migration from Qadian had been indicated with certainty and I decided to leave Qadian, a message was sent to Lahore by telephone that some transport might be arranged for, but no reply was received for eight or ten days and finally the reply that came was that Government was not able to arrange for any transport…then Captain Attaullah procured the car of Nawab Muhammad Din and the jeep of Mirza Mansoor Ahmad and cars of some other friends.. We thus traveled from Qadian to Lahore, in accordance with Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s revelation, ‘After Eleven’." 2 It is alleged that during his journey from Qadian to Lahore, he wore a veil (burqa) to conceal his identity. There is also a story that he attired himself as Hindu Yogi and left for Lahore secretly in a plane leaving Qadiani community at the mercy of unruly Hindu and Sikh attackers. 3 All these stories are wrong. He did not conceal his identity during the journey.

A Qadiani belonging to Lahori Section draws the following conclusions on the basis of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s revelations concerning the exodus of Ahmadis from Qadian:

"Then again Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad received another ‘ilham’ about Qadian (the town where he lived). ‘People having natures like Yazid would be born in this town’ (Tazkira, P.181). Now Yazid (son of Muawiya) was the second Khalifa, of the Omayyed Dynasty, with their capital at Damascus (Syria). He was instrumental in introducing a secular and absolute monarchy amongst the Muslims and was guilty of killing Hazrat Imam Hussain (grandson of the Holy Prophet p.b.o.h). So the ‘ilham’ refers to a time when a Khalifa like Yazid would appear amongst the Ahmadiyya community, who would, of course, claim to be a holy one but would actually be a worldly person. Then circumstances will arise which will cause this Yazid like Khalifa and his followers to be driven out of Qadian. This is corroborated by another ‘Ilham’ of Hazrat Mirza Sahib saying ‘The Evil Spirit of Damascus’ So that just like Yazid was the Evil Spirit of Damascus, so would be a similar evil spirit to born in Qadian.’ 4

Post-Partition Qadian

Qadiani volunteers waged a desperate struggle for their survival in Qadian.5 They equipped themselves with light arms, paraded in and around that area and had frequent clashed with armed Sikh bands. On 28 August, Sir Zafarullah met Lord Mountbatten and impressed upon him the need to save Qadian.6 Molvi Saleem, the Qadiani missionary at Calcutta, visited Pandit Nehru, Sardar Baldev Singh and Maulana Azad in connection with the security of Qadian. The Indian authorities alleged that Qadianis had been attacking Sikh villages and had terrorized their inhabitants. It also came to their notice that big arms and ammunition dumps existed in Qadian. The Qadian volounteers said to have been using arms in the name of self-defense.7 The Indian Government arrested some notable Qadianis viz Fateh Muhammad Sayal, Nazir Tabligh, under Section 3020, Syed Waliullah, Nazar Amoor Aama Qadian (Section 302) and Ch. Abdul Bari, Nazir Treasury, under the Safety Ordinance to ease the Qadiani Sikh tension prevailing in and around Qadian.

In a press conference in Lahore, Mirza Mahmud announced his decision that Ahmadis would stick to Qadian till Indian Government gave a written order that they could not allow them to stay there. He added that time had come when the Governments of both the Dominions should confer on the paramount necessity of protecting the sacred religious centers such as Sarhind Sharif, Ajmer Sharif, Delhi, Qadian and Nankana Sahib. Both the Dominions should agree to allow Muslims and non-Muslims to stay at their respective sacred places with full guarantees for protection of life and property.

He said that he had invited Gandhi Ji and certain members of the British Parliament to visit Qadian and see with their own eyes the state of affairs prevailing there. He declared that inspite of open hostility of the military and the police, it had been decided not to evacuate Qadian and keep such number of persons there as could be adequately fed and live in reasonably sanitary atmosphere. He emphasized that the question of Qadian could not be treated as an individual case but had to be taken up on a national plan.8

Qadiani leadership continued to put all their pressure on Pandit Nehru, Gandhiji, Maulana Azad and some British civil and military officers to arrive at an agreement with the Indian Government regarding the fate of Ahmadis in Qadian. At Lake Success, New York, in January and February 1948 the UN Security Council debated the Indo Pak dispute on Kashmir. Sir Zafarullah, Pakistan Representative to the UN, in his speech on 15 January 1948, referred to massacres of "Ahmadi Muslims" in his hometown of Qadian. Sir Gopala Swami Ayenagar, the Indian Representative refuted all of his charges. Sir Zafarullah, in his speech dated 24 January 1948 again referred to the events of his home town and remarked:

"The representative of India has charged me with having tried to create a wrong impression in the minds of the members of the Security Council with regard to what occurred to my home town in Qadian. I wish to make it clear that the reference to my own home was not by way of a specific complaint or grievance as to what had occurred. (Where millions had lost their homes and all that they possessed, and had gone through various stages and degrees of suffering and misery, it would have been out of place to mention the loss of one’s own home). I mentioned it as an instance where one knew what had occurred, and yet the Government of India had chosen to deny altogether that any thing had occurred.   What actually happened is that his house was looted by the military and by Sikhs for five days between 27th September and 1st October. By the sheerest coincidence, a Delhi newspaper came to my attention, in which I noticed the second installment of incidents that took place at Qadian, where my home was, and which incidentally, is the headquarter of religious movement having missions all over the world.   I might mention that at my request and the request of other prominent members of their particular movement, the Government of India sent a detachment of troops stationed there to give us protection, and it also sent an additional police."9 The Hindustan Times disclosed that all thanks go to Pandit Nehru who took personal interest in the matter and the "Ahmadiyyas including their Khalifa were able to cross to Pakistan safely under military escort. The border is only 20 miles away. However, 313 able-bodied men stayed behind to look after the Anjuman’s work in India." 10

Those who stayed in Qadian are called Ahmadi Dervishes (chosen hermits). Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, in one of his revelations, claimed that an angel gave him a bread (Nan) and told that was for him and his Dervishes. These men are also called Ashab-iSufa. The period of Dervishship started on 16 November 1947 in Qadian 11 when an agreement was concluded with the Indian Government. Their number changes but does not decrease from 313. In 1966 their number was one thousand.12 It is alleged that some Dervishes are the agents of foreign powers and had been hiding themselves in a sacred enclave. Their role came under attack during 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars.

The Hindustan Times gives post-Partition picture of Qadian in these words:

‘Among the prominent persons who visited Qadian in these days (1947) to reassure the Ahmadiyya, were Bengal Chief Minister, H.S.Suhrawardy (on instructions from Mahatma Gandhi), Mirdual Sarabai and Gen Thimaya. Later Acharya Vinoba-Bhave also paid visit to the town.13 However Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan occupied the houses, shops and lands vacated by the Ahmadiyyas in Qadian. The Talim-ul-Islam Degree College became the Sikh National College evacuated from Lahore, the Talim ul Islam High School turned into the Kalaswala Khalsa High School (orginally located in the Gujrat district) and the Nusrat Girls High School was renamed the Ved Kaur Arya Girls High School. The Ahmadiyya College for training missionaries was not effected. The Noor Hospital administered by the Anjuman was taken over by the State Government to run as a Civil Hospital.’


Mirza Mahmud temporarily encamped at Rattan Bagh Lahore. Then he acquired 1034 acres of land in district Jhang (Punjab) to set up a Zilli Qadian, 14 called Rabwah in last quarter of 1948. About two years before partition, Mirza Mahmud claimed to have a vision in which Qadian was attacked with such force that he had to evacuate the Ahmadiyya Community. It was ‘revealed’ to him that the Ahmadis would find refuge in ‘nila gumbad’, which means blue dome. Since there is a section of Lahore known as Nila Gumbad, the name being derived from a mosque in the vicinity whose dome at one time was covered with blue tiles. The Khalifa assumed that the vision referred to a future refuge in Lahore. However, when the forced eviction actually did take place, emissaries of the Khalifa discovered that the community would not be welcomed at Lahore, and they were left with problem of finding a place to go, reports came in that Rabwah site could be purchased, a location bounded on two sides by hills. Bashir-ud-Din was reminded by his advisers that the published report of his vision had contained a reference to hills also. Furthermore, he now realized that Nila Gumbad was the blue dome of the open sky. With the certain feeling that God had revealed to him the destination, the Khalifa, like a modern Moses, brought his people out of India to the promised land of Pakistan. 15

Rabwah remained more or less an independent Ahmadiyya state. The Rabwah Administration ran a parallel Government in early decades. Officials of local bodies and other agencies were appointed by the Punjab Government, with the consent of the Rabwah Administration. Even a Deputy Commissioner in Jhang could not be appointed without the prior clearance of Mirza Mahmud, not to speak of other civil officials. Rabwah College had no non-Qadiani staff. Since property in Rabwah was owned by the Ahmadiyya Anjuman, no one could sell/purchase a plot, construct a house or run a business without their permission. No one dared to defy Ahmadiyya authority. The dissidents had to face a tough time including social boycott, maltreatment, assaults and humiliation. It was a closed city. Sir Francis Mudie, the then Governor of the Punjab, was favourably inclined to Qadianis. The Rabwah land was sold to them at throwaway prices. The lease agreement was hurriedly concluded to afford an opportunity to Qadianis to settle earlier. The place had a strategic importance for them. It is safe from any attack from the side of Chiniot, as it has been separated by the river. They kept this aspect in view while selecting a place for their headquarters.

Aspiration for Qadian

Although Mirza Mahmud set up a center at Rabwah, he always yearned for Qadian. He made his followers believe that they would get back Qadian and exhorted them to make attempts at reunion of Pakistan with India.

Munir Report states:

"When the possibility of a separate homeland for Muslims by the Partition of the country began faintly to appear on the horizon, Ahmadis began to concern themselves with the shadow of coming events. Some of their writings from 1945 to early 1947 disclose that they expected to succeed to the British but when the faint vision of Pakistan began to assume the form of a coming reality, they felt it to be somewhat difficult permanently to reconcile themselves with the idea of new state. They must have found themselves on the horns of dilemma because they could neither elect for India, a Hindu secular state, nor for Pakistan where schism was not expected to be encouraged. Some of their writings show that they were opposed to the Partition, and that if Partition came, they could strive for reunion."16 The loss of Qadian was greatly felt in Ahmadiyya circles but they satisfied themselves with the interpretation of Mirza’s prophecies regarding the return to Qadian. The plight of Qadian migrants was compared with the exodus of Jews. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had already claimed to be Moses for Ahmadiyya Jewry. Frequent references were cited from the dreams and utterance of Mirza Qadiani to maintain that Ahmadis would soon return to Qadian, the Holy Land of the Promised Messiah. 17 Mirza Mahmud believed that milk in the breasts of Mecca and Madina had dried up, it was now flowing in Qadian.18 Qadian is the "throne seat of the Messenger of God."19 It is like the Haram 20 and the Madina of Ahmadis. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad called it 'an abode of safety’ and the ‘Jerusalem.’ Situated there is the Minaret of Messiah, which the Mirza built himself to fulfill a prophecy. The mosque of the Promised Messiah is the Masjid-Aqsa referred to in the Holy Quran.21 The other important mosque of Qadian is Majid-i-Mubarak, the Blessed Mosque.22 Bahishti Maqbra or the Cemetery of Paradise also lies there. 23 All this made it Sanctum Sanctorum and a sign of God (Shaar-Allah).

Every Ahmadis had to take firm oath that he would never lose sight of his main objective of return to Qadian. He had to prepare his family to offer all sort of sacrifices for the return to Qadian.24

A dream of Mirza Mahmud (11 June 1951) makes it amply clear that he aspired to get back Qadian by all means. 25 Just after his arrival in Lahore till his death he kept on repeating the same theme. His prophecies signify that Ahmadis would surely get back Qadian. That would either be by peaceful means or by converting the whole population of the district of Gurdaspur to Ahmadiyyat, a very ambitious target. It was also held that Ahmadis had to wage a war if the need arose. To be perfect in faith every Ahmadi must keep in mind the ultimate return to their original and real center. If Ahmadis had no power at this timke, that made no difference at all. Even Jesus Christ had no power when he declares his Ministry. Mirza Mahmud advised his followers to incorporate his advice in their faiths that no small or big Government or a body of Governments could ever keep them away from their goal. ‘If these Governments would dare to interfere, the angles would come down from the Heaven to get Ahmadis take their living center of Qadian’, 26 he claimed.

A decade after independence, he predicted:

‘Do not be disappointed. Rely on God, He will help create circumstances favorable to (your return to Qadian). Do not you see that Jews had to wait for 1300 years and at last they were able to settle themselves in Palestine. But you have not to wait for 1300 years, it is possible that you have not to wait for 13 years or even 10 years and God would bestow His blessings upon you.’ 27 Mirza Mahmud, on the one hand, gave the good news of return to Qadian to his followers and on the other hand made secret contacts with the Sikh leadership to impress upon them the need for the safety and protection of Qadian. He desired to get their full cooperation in the event of a political crisis. Qadian elders supported the Sikh demand of a special status for Nankana Sahib situated at Sheikhupura, Pakistan, the birthplace of Guru Nank. When Gyani Kartar Sing made a demand in October, 1947 that Vatican status should be given to Nankana Sahib, AlFazl fully supported it. It was called a ‘just and reasonable demand’, although it had been put forth too late. 28

In order to retain their legal claim on the properties of Qadian, instructions were given to Pakistan Ahmadis not to submit claims for their properties in Pakistan which they had left in Qadian and its surrounding villages of Nangal, Bhani, Khara etc.29 It was made clear to them that since they had come to Pakistan only temporarily compelled by the political circumstances of the time, they would definitely get back Qadian in near future after making two or three attempts.30 To retain their claim on properties in Qadian they should not submit the claims in Pakistan. It was also declared that the dead bodies of the Khalifa and other members of the Mirza family (Khandan-i-Nabuwat) should be buried in Rabwah as an "Amanat" to be carried to Qadian at a proper time. The inscriptions on the graves of the wife of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Mirza Mahmud and other members of the Mirza family still remind every Qadiani the Will of Mirza Mahmud that they must have to take their dead bodies to Qadian for formal burial in Bahishti Maqbra.

The possibility of Akali-Qadiani compromise on holy places of Nankana Sahib and Qadian lurks in the minds of Rabwah elders. They always look to political developments in the Indian Punjab with keen interest. Just after the Partition, Qadianis approached the Sikh leadership to forge better relations between the two communities. In 1953, a fraternal delegation of Ahmadis from Pakistan led by the brother of Sir Zafarullah Khan went to Qadian taking with them vials of holy water from the Nankana Sahib shrine in Pakistan and copies of the Granth Sahib for presentation to the Sikh Community of Qadian. In return they were given copies of the Quran. Such courtesies express the desire of the responsible leadership of both communities to build better relations between themselves.31

Dr Shankar Das Mehra, a veteran Congress leader who has been visualizing a great potential in Ahmadiyyat in forging good relations with Hindus since mid 30s, sent an article on Ahmadiyyat to the Statesman Calcutta which appeared in its issue of 22 February 1949. He suggested to the Government of India to come to an alliance with the Ahmadiyya Jama'at to revive the past glory of India. "The movement deserved attention, as its founder was a Hindustani, their Mecca was Qadian and it had no real sympathies for the political aspirations of the Muslim World". 32he argued.

In a letter to Nazir-I-Aala, Qadian, on 26 Decmeber 1949 he pinned hopes on the Swadeshi (national) character of the movement and spoke high of it in bringing two communities of India viz. Hindus and Muslims, closer to each other.33

Zafarullah as Foreign Minister

Qadianis made a drastic change in the aims and scope of their ambitions when Sir Zafarullah was invited to become the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 25 December 1947.34 The precise circumstances of Sir Zafarullah being asked first to plead the Pakistan case before the Boundary Commission, where his community had entered a plea as a separate community and that resulted into loss of Gurdaspur to Pakistan, and later as Foreign Minister, are subject of further research. At the time of Partition, Sir Zafarullah was the Constitutional Adviser to the Nawab of Bhopal. 35 Quaid-e-Azam desired H.S. Suharwardy to join the Central Government at Foreign Office. But he was sore at the way Kh. Nazimuddin had been made the first Chief Minister of erstwhile East Pakistan. He declined the offer on the ground that he was engaged in helping the Indian Muslims caught in unprecedented communal riots that had erupted in the wake of independence.36 Sir Zafarullah’s appointment was criticized by a section of Pakistan press on the ground that he was a die-hard Qadiani and had never joined the Muslim League rather he made every attempt to sabotage the sole representative organization of Muslims of India. 37

The Quaid offered him an important post although he knew well his past career. Sir Muhammad Ismail says:

"During Willingdon’s Viceroyalty when Sir Zafarullah was the Executive Counselor, Mr. M.A. Jinnah, in spite of his eminence in the political field, was kept out of the Round Table Conference in its later stages. Still the Quaid entrusted the Foreign Affairs of Pakistan to him. This instance was sufficient to show how magnanimous he could be."38 It has been said that the Quaid had been prevailed upon to appoint Sir Zafarullah because Zafarullah was very close to the British and the bureaucrats who had recommended him felt there was a need to counterbalance Lord Mountbatten’s open hostility towards the nascent state. Perhaps he had in mind the British attitude towards Pakistan in making this decision. Not only were the British accountable for many of the acute problems which faced Pakistan at its birth, they still had a hand in its affairs. And Lord Mountbatten was frankly hostile. Someone was, therefore, needed who could use his personal influence with White Hall in smoothing out the unresolved matters. Hence the choice of Ch. Zafarullah Khan, the acid test of the Jama'at Ahmadiyya’s attitude was, however, provided by the Pakistan movement in which it did not participate.39

The group which had been most dominant and powerful in Pakistan’s emerging foreign policy making apparatus was bureaucratic elite, consisting of top civil servants and high echelon of Pakistan military establishment. Initially, there was neither a well-organized Foreign Office of Pakistan nor any well-equipped and trained Pakistan Foreign Service. In the early years, some old hands of British India’s Political Department used to man the higher posts of Pakistan’s Foreign Office. Among them were some Britishers who mostly belonged to the old ICS Cadre. These British officers viz. Creagh Coin, Fletcher, Dixon and Redpath had set the early tone of the Pakistan’s foreign policy administration and moulded the political outlook of its Foreign Office and its personnel.

After the death of Quaid-I-Azam and the departure of some British Officers, the whole foreign policy establishment went under the grip of some top Pakistan civil servants as the political elite at that time were fiercely engaged in domestic power struggle.40 Iskandar Mirza, Ch.Muhammad Ali (both of them later became the top office holders), Muhammad Ikramullah, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs during 1947-51, Aziz Ahmad and a few other civil servants like Akhtar Hussain, who came from Supply and Agha Hilaly from Education, Health and Lands, became the key figures in the Foreign Office. Some high ranking military officers, like Ayub Khan entered into this group of foreign policy elite and began to influence the foreign policy processes, particularly after the death of Quaid-I-Azam. It is on record that as early as 1951 Ayub Khan started thinking in terms of Pakistan’s joining the western military bloc.

It is doubtful if the Quaid, like other elites of newly founded state, was aware of the Qadiani leadership’s theologian, in fact prophetic views about the future of the state he had founded, yet he did direct that all matters of policy nature should be referred either to him or to the Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan. But in actual practice, it was the Foreign Minister who was to decide which was routine and which was a policy matter. 41

Contact Campaign

After Zafarullah’s assumption of the portfolio of Foreign Ministership of Pakistan, the head of Ahmadiyya community got himself activity involved in Pakistan politics. He wrote a series of articles in AlFazl, Lahore from September 1947 to January 1948 on the defense potential and economic viability of newly established state of Pakistan. He proposed that Pakistan should take every step to cooperate with India in the political and economic fields as well as in the sphere of defense.42 Elaborating on economic, political and defense potentialities of Pakistan, he proposed to establish a Territorial Force and Army Clubs for the country. In his fourth lecture on the ‘Future of Pakistan’ held in Law College, Lahore, he stressed the need of joint defense with India. He explained that Pakistan Army was 80,000 in number and included infantry, artillery, parachuters etc of which only 40,000 or its 50 percent was a fighting force. On the basis of data worked out in relation to total border area with the fighting force, he concluded that Pakistan could deploy only 43 men to defend one mile of its border of which 21 men could actually fight. He gave the example of Germany, which deployed one thousand army men to defend one mile of its territory. He called Pakistan defense very weak because it had a very small number of experienced officers, no reserve force and poor artillery with little ammunition. Parachute Battalion would likely to be disbanded. There was not a single ordnance factory in the country. After pointing out these shortcomings, he strongly pleaded that Pakistan and India must jointly devise their defense systems.43 He also argued that Indian sub-continent was a geographical entity even if it would be divided into million parts. Keeping this end in view, Pakistan and India should forge a common cause in their defense policy,44 he concluded.

After advocating a joint defense scheme, he turned towards the Muslim League. In an interview with the APP, Mirza Mahmud demanded that doors of the League should be kept open for all non-Muslims of Pakistan in order to reorganize this party on democratic and internationally recognized principles. It was argued that after the establishment of Pakistan, the League had no basis for existence neither in Pakistan nor in India. ‘Muslims of India should join the Indian National Congress’, he maintained.45

To introduce himself in political circles of the then West Pakistan, he embarked upon a tour of the area in March 1948. He visited Sialkot, Jhelum, Karachi, Peshwar, Rawalpindi and Quetta, addressed selected gatherings, met civil and military officers and political leaders of repute.46 He discussed the key political problems of Pakistan including Kashmir issue, defense policy and the future of the newly created Muslim state of Pakistan.

In his tour to the NWFP in early April 1948 he met Shinwari and Afridi Chiefs in Landi Kotal, addressed two gatherings at Peshawar and called on Dr Khan Sahib and Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Utmanzai.47

Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were tense since November 1947 when Sardar Najibullah came to Karachi as a special envoy of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan to hold talks with Pakistan officials. After his return to Kabul, Afghanistan kept on raising the slogan of Pakhtunistan in high pitch. Qadianis had a pathological hatred for Kabul as their missionaries were slain there at different occasions. Zafarullah’s bias played a key role in formative phase of Pakistan Foreign policy towards Kabul.

On his return from Peshawar, Mirza Mahmud stayed in Rawalpindi where he addressed a selected gathering in Cinema Hall and spoke on Kashmir problem. He claimed to play a very crucial role if so desired by the Government of Pakistan because Abdullah had a great respect for him. People demonstrated outside the hall and the police had to resort to lathi charge to disperse the agitating crowd.

From Pindi he left for Quetta. Ahmadiyya community Quetta arranged a reception in his honour on 14 June 1948. The participants included M.Kazmi, the Iranian Counsel; Ministers of Kalat State, top ranking civil and military officials, Sir Philips Edward, Political Agent Quetta, Mirza Bashir Ahmad S.O.Quetta, Mr. Balang SP, Mr. Beck DSP, Khan Bahadur Malik Bashir Ahmad, Under Secretary, Adj. Gen., Nawab Raisani, Agha Sarwar Shah, Commissioner Colony Revenue Commission, Nawab Karam Khan Kansi, Muhammad Khan Jogezai, Mir Doda Khan and some senior members of the Muslim League. He discussed the issue of Islamic constitution and emphasized the need to support the volunteers fighting in Kashmir.48 To his followers his message was to attain power and get it even by force if it was not possible to have it by peaceful means.49 He exhorted Ahmadis to launch a vigorous conversion campaign. These utterances, afterwards, resulted in a counter offensive from the ulema against Qadianism.


On 11 September 1948 Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah passed away. It was a tremendous loss to the Nation. People were mourning the death of their great leader when the news came that the Indian forces had marched into Hyderabad Deccan.

Hyderabad enjoyed a peculiar position during the British rule. The Nizam had the Imperialist favour only except in mid 20s when he tried to assert his position by declaring the sovereignty of the state in internal affairs. The Viceroy, Lord Reading, sharply reacted over it and a Council was setup on 27 March 1926 to administer the State affairs. Four British officers were included in the Council. The Nizam had lost almost all power and became a titular head of the Hindu dominated State.50 The Nizam’s sons, Prince of Berar and Muazzam Jah were at war with each other. Berar borrowed a huge amount of money from the Hindu moneylenders for his personal use and collaborated with the British Officers to come to power at an appropriate time. Some Qadiani members of Sikanderabad family always planted their agents in the King Palace who informed Qadian of all the palace intrigues. Qadian promoted Prince Berar. In an address in late 1948, at the time of Indian capture of Hyderabad, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad revealed that Prince Berar had entered into a secret agreement with some Mahasabai Hindus 21-year ago (1927). He received money and promised them certain concessions in the event of his assumption of power at an appropriate time. The agreement came to the notice of one of the Prince’s confidants (probably a Qadiani). He stole it from his papers and handed it over to Mirza Mahmud Ahmad.51 A probe by the Qadiani intelligence gave the background of the agreement. That since Prince Berar did not receive pocket money from the state exchequer, he borrowed money from Hindu moneylenders, who took advantage of the situation and concluded a secret agreement with him. Mirza Mahmud says that he brought this agreement to the notice of the Government. The British Government ordered the Nizam to pay him about 10 to 20 thousand rupee per month.

Mirza Mahmud further says that he was in favour of bartering away Hyderabad for Kashmir. He argues that Hyderabad, according to its conditions should have formed part of the Indian Union as Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. He claims to have always been inviting the attention of the Muslims to the fact that both these issues (Kashmir and Hyderabad) are linked with each other and should be dealt with jointly. He means to say ‘give Hyderabad to India and get Kashmir from it.’ He deplored that sometimes the leaders of the nation get so subservient to aspirations of the masses that they could not adopt a right course. He expressed doubts in the ability of Prince Berar and Qasim Rizvi to deliver goods.52

Political Strategy

Muslim of Pakistan saw that Zafarullah did not participate in the funeral prayers of the Quaid on the plea that he was a non-Muslim. Qadianis openly called 900 million Muslims confirmed heretics (Kafirs) and the Quaid was no exception. This sparked off heated controversy through out Pakistan but Qadianis cared little for it. The Imperialist powers fully backed them achieve their evil designs directed to undermine the integrity of Pakistan.

Qadianis had held the belief during the British rule in India (and even still maintain) that they could prosper and propagate their ideas only under the ‘shield’ of the British and that they could work properly neither in Mecca, not in Syria, nor in Kabul except under this (British) Government for whose progress and prosperity, the founder of the community used ever to pray.’53 They now found the Pakistan situation too quite prospective. During his political tours Mirza Mahmud exhorted the followers to concentrate on and convert the large and thinly populated Baluchistan and ‘be in a position to call at least one province as our own.’54 He asked them not to flock like sheep in one or two departments but to spread out in all the key sectors. And as for the military, if one assumed that there were 10,000 Ahmadis in Pakistan, then 9,000 should go to the military.

Military preparation is a very important thing. How could you do your work until you have not learnt the military science? He asked. ‘The subsequent devaluation and corruption of Pakistan democracy, sabotage of the democratic process, hindrances created in the enforcement of the Islamic laws and the emergence first of the bureaucracy and later the military as the country’s ruling class should have been seen in the background of such deep rooted Qadiani intrigues.’55

Broadly speaking, the post-Partition Ahmadiyya policy toward Pakistan rested on the following points:

  1. Setting up of a base in Pakistan. Mirza Mahmud had eyes on Kashmir and Baluchistan.
  2. Penetration into Armed Forces.
  3. Return to Qadian by undoing the Partition.
  4. Opening up of new missions especially in Afro-Arab countries with the support of Sir Zafarullah.


Qadiani intrigues in Kashmir had a long history. These have been briefly discussed in the previous chapters while stating Qadiani role in All India Kashmir Committee (1931). In 1933, Qadiani disruptionists formed an All India Kashmir Association to further their nefarious ends with the support of British Imperialism. The Qadiani periodical Al Islah, was brought out from Srinagar to influence public opinion. From 1933 to 1946 Qadiani role in Kashmir politics was manifestly pro-Maharaja.56 Sheikh Abdullah launched ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement in 1946 which was directed against the Dogra ruler and was modeled on the Congress ‘Quit India Movement’ of 1942. He used the platform of National Conference, which was formed in 1939 in opposition to Muslim Conference. Mirza Mahmud severely criticized the anti-Maharahja ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement and supported the policy of Maharaja of Kashmir.57 He forgot all love for Kashmir freedom fighters in the last phase of their struggle. He exhorted his followers to fully concentrate on the conversion of Kashmiris to Ahmadiyyat and expressed his firm conviction that Kashmiris would embrace Ahmadiyyat enmasse as happened in case of the villages of Asnor, Chak Sunrij, Risshi Nagar etc.

AlFazl gives a report of Ahmadiyya mission’s activities in Kashmir:

"Hazrat Muslih Maud in his Advisory Committee Meeting last year (1945) had kindly given the approval for setting up a Missionary Center in Kashmir keeping in view the importance of this State in his mind. There was a need to establish a Darul Tabligh (Center for Propagation of Beliefs) and ‘mosque’. The Government of Kashmir has been pleased to give four Kanals of land for the ‘mosque’, Darul Tabligh and guesthouse. Hazrat Mushil Maud sent a congratulatory telegram to Ahmadiyya missionary when we got the land." 58 Qadianis were also jubilant over the success of Ghulam Babi Gilkar, President Jama'at Ahmadiyya, Srinagar from Fateh Kadal Constituency as member of the Kashmir Assembly.

Ahmadis from Jammu visited Qadian and deplored the apathy of Mirza Mahmud towards Kashmir liberation movement at that critical stage of struggle. Mirza Mahmud gave at length his past role in Kashmir movement during (1930s) and criticized the present Kashmir leadership for launching a movement having an anti Maharaja stance. ‘Blames are being leveled against the Maharaja and his family, it is wrong and we strongly oppose this movement. All our sympathies are with the Maharaja of Kashmir. Nevertheless he should also take care of his subjects,’59 he emphasized.

Mirza Mahmud, in reply to an address from a group of Qadianis of Kashmir stated that there was no doubt that he had taken interest in Kashmir politics and had been willing to offer his assistance to the interested parties if they promised to work under his direction. ‘We were willing to cooperate with them and the success could be achieved that way,’ he maintained.

He narrated one of his dreams, which he saw in 1942 about the Maharaja of Kashmir. "The dream was also repeated the next day. The Promised Messiah had also seen a similar dream regarding Maharaja of Patiala. This showed that there was some relationship of Patiala and Kashmir with the Punjab politics. Anyhow, we had been continuously making efforts to spread Ahmadiyyat and our Jama'ats had encircled Kashmir",60 he emphasized.

With the transfer of power to the successor States of India and Pakistan, the British paramountacy over the princely states lapsed. The Indian leaders had planned to take over Kashmir long before the Partition. The Radcliffe Award allotted Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur to India, thereby providing India with lines of communications to the Kashmir Valley which it otherwise could not have had.

AK Government

Pakistan leadership was over-burdened with problems and could not take proper action to counter Indian aggressive moves. The voluntary expedition of tribesmen to liberate the State from Dogra ruler proved to be abortive owing to lack of planning and resources. The people of Poonch waged a heroic struggle against the Dogra repressive regime. Mirza Mahmud lost no time to form a Qadiani Battalion to fight on Kashmir front. Qadianis had always opposed Jehad as the very coming of the Promised Messiah was to abrogate the holy war for all times to come. It was an article of their faith and they strictly adhered to it during the British rule in India. But now the political expediency forced Mirza Mahmud to send Furqan Battalion to Kashmir border to watch Ahmadi interests in Kashmir imbroglio and to promote the strategic interests relating to Qadian. Many Qadiani agents were already active in Poonch and the Valley. They undertook secret missions to Kashmir under the instructions of Mirza Mahmud.

Qadianis advance a claim that during the liberation movement in Kashmir, Ghulam Nabi Gilkar formed the First Azad Kashmir Government in exile at Rawalpindi. He said to have left for Srinagar on 6 October to arrest Maharaja Hari Singh.61 A 13-member Cabinet was secretly formed in Srinagar which included Minister-designate for education, health, defense, law, etc. It was a Qadiani shadow Cabinet. Gilkar was arrested in Srinagar and remained in jail for a few months.

Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz says:

‘The President of Provisional Government as announced by Radio Pakistan was Anwar. Who is this Anwar? Three men have come forward since, each claiming that it is he but it is believed by reliable people that Anwar was no other person than Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, a member of the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference, one of the old veterans of the Kashmir freedom movement who headed the provisional revolutionary Government of Azad Kashmir. No soon was the provisional Government formed than its President did a childish and fantastic thing. He proceeded to Srinagar with the intention of arresting the Maharaja and warning Abdullah of the dangerous consequences of his contemplated step in forcing the state to accede to India. This self styled president was arrested and detained. He met Abdullah before his detention and had a talk with him but he did not reveal his indentity.’62 The underground ‘Cabinet’ supposed to be formed by Gilkar included either Qadiani or pro-Qadiani elements. Names of all of them were not revealed except persons like Abdul Ghaffar Dar, Deputy Publicity Officer (designate), Khawaja Abdul Mannan, Chief Engineer etc.63

There is absolutely no truth in Qadiani claim that Gilkar formed the first Provisional Azad Kashmir Government. On 4 October, Syed Nazir Hussain Shah, a veteran leader from Jammu announced the formation of Azad Kashmir Government. The announcement was made under the fictitious name of ‘Anwar.’64 He himself told the scribe that since he loved the Turk General Anwar Pasha, he used that name for the attainment of a sublime cause. Subsequently Ghulam Nabi Gilkar appended his name with the epithet of Anwar. Gilker always opposed Pakistan stand on Kashmir issue and advocated 'Independent Kashmir’ theory. The Azad Kashmir government was formed on 24 October 1947 in the liberated area of Kashmir and Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim became its first President.65

On 26 October, India launched a full-fledged attack on Kashmir after the Maharaja’s shady deal with the Congress leadership. When it was brought to the notice of the Quaid he immediately responded by ordering General Gracey, the Acting C-in-C Pakistan Army, to dispatch Pakistan troops to Kashmir, but the British C-in-C refused to carry out these orders even though his British counterparts on the Indian side were busy mounting an armed attack in Jammu and Kashmir State.

Philip Warner, the biographer of Field Marshal Auchinleck states:

"Auchinleck promptly flew to Lahore (after the landing of Indian troops in Kashmir on the orders of General Lockart, the C-in-C of the Indian Armed Forces). Here General Sir Douglas Gracey (deputising for Messervy, C-in-C Pakistan Armed Forces, who was on leave) informed him that he had been told by Jinnah to send troops to Kashmir for various missions, including that of capturing Srinagar. Obviously Pakistan’s Governor General would not let Kashmir so willingly. Auchinleck stated very clearly to Jinnah that what he was proposing to do was quite irregular, for Kashmir had now legally became part of India. He quietly pointed out that if Jinnah tried to proceed he himself would order all British officers to withdraw from Pakistan’s Army, a threat which infuriated but at the same time checked Jinnah. Auchinleck then suggested that Jinnah should meet Nehru, Mountbatten, the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Prime Minister in a conference, to which the Muslim leader had no choice but to agree. In the event Nehru was ill and was unable to go, though it was agreed in principle that a plebiscite would be called to determine the real feeling in Kashmir." 66 In the UN

On Ist January 1948, India went to the Security Council with complaint that Pakistan was aiding and abetting the frontier tribesmen and its own national to join fighting in the State. While the Council was still debating the issue, India intensified its operations in the State, which forced Pakistan to send a limited number of troops into Kashmir to hold essential defensive positions.

Sir Gopal Swami Ayenger spoke on behalf of India and Zafarullah presented Pakistan case in the Security Council.

"The sum of his (Zafarullah’s) arguments67 concerning Kashmir was that the accession together with the massacre of Muslims in East Punjab and the neighboring Sikh and Hindu State were factors in one vast plot. He concluded with a suggestion that India’s appeal to the Security Council was due to the failure of her Army to enforce a decision. In this there was certainly an element of truth. In the opening presentation, Sir Zafarullah Khan may well have overplayed his hand. Dramatic and startling accusations exposing Indian leadership as a diabolical tyranny seeking its satisfaction through blood were not likely to impress the Security Council. His tendency to excessive length was also a handicap." 68 Mirza Mahmud in his address in Rawalpindi on 12 April 1948 already made it clear that the decision of the Security Council would be against Pakistan. That decision would be guide by international factors and even ten Zafarullah Khans could have no influence over it.69 He disclosed that Sir G.S.Ayenger had assured America and Britain70 that India would provide required concessions in the wake of war with the Russians.

The Council appointed the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate the facts and mediate between the parties. ‘When the Commission arrived in Pakistan on 7 July, 1948 it at once got a frank acknowledgement from Zafarullah Khan that Pakistan troops had been fighting in Kashmir since 8 May. This fact was widely known but had not previously been admitted by the Pakistan Government. In the eyes of the Commission it constituted "a material change in the situation" and it stated so in correspondence with the Pakistan Government. Pakistan also admitted in August 1948 that Azad Kashmir forces were under the operational control of Pakistan army. 71 This changed the nature of the issue. India exploited the situation to its advantage.

The UN Commission, after prolonged negotiations secured agreement of the parties to what are known as the UN Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It provided for a cease-fire, which went into effect on 1st January 1949. It proved fatal to the Kashmir problem. Sir Zafarullah’s unusually lengthy speeches in the UN made the issue further complicated. Pakistan got bogged down in textual battles with India over demilitarization proposals losing sight of the primary objective, which was that of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office.

Main Iftikharuddin, a veteran Muslim leaguer, in a speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 5 October 1950 criticized Zafarullah’s role in a very lucid and impressive manner:

"Don’t we clearly see that their (American and British Imperialists) sole interest is to maintain their hold over the peoples of the East whom they cannot rule by old methods, whom they must rule now indirectly through their agents and we have lent ourselves consciously or unconsciously, our Government has lent itself consciously or unconsciously to be their agents. That is the role we have played on this question. Sir, you just think of man I am just saying that and I am not opposing any individual and so long as the policy of the Government would remain what it has been obviously the best man will go and prove himself to be a failure but this shows the symbolic appearance of the mind and the intention and intensity of the feelings of the Pakistan Government. What I mean is that Sir Zafarullah may be an able lawyer of thirty years or forty years standing and a confirmed believer in British Raj-more loyal than the King himself in whose thirty years not on one moment he did think it necessary to get up and ask for freedom of this country. He helped the British Government throughout his life. That person could go and speak, if he gets money, on behalf of Bahawalpur or Bhopal or on behalf of the Indian Government, he would go and represent as a diplomatic representative of the Indian Government, if he is paid as he did in China and similarly he is representing Pakistan Government as he is being paid to do so. He would even go and represent the United Indian Government, if Heaven forbid that State comes into being tomorrow, if the Government pays him to do so. That person we have sent to safeguard our interests because that is the best lawyer that we could get. That very lawyer represented us on the question of boundaries and we know what Radcliffe Award was. That very lawyer was the intellectual leader of the hated Unionists, the most reactionary element and the ugliest element in politics that this sub-continent has produced. That person cannot feel the throb of freedom of the people of Kashmir. He cannot fight for them. He can only do hair splitting. That person cannot give a policy.   Sir, that is the proof that person must be faithful to British interests. His object is to prolong the discussion, prolong the whole affairs, so that both India and Pakistan may look up to Britain and America for help. Our worthy Minister is more an agent of the British than of the American. However, that is besides the point. The thing is this that this policy has not given us Kashmir."73

Furqan Battalion

In June, 1948 Mirza Mahmud set up Furqan Battalion to axe his grind in Kashmir affairs. In a special session of Majlis-i-Shoora, he announced that he had been persuaded by some military officers to send at least a platoon on Jammu front to take part in Kashmir war. Under the command of Mirza Mubarak Ahmad, a platoon of 45 Ahmadis, after receiving instructions from M.M.Ahmad, then Deputy Commissioner Sialkot, moved to MirajKay to fight on the Jammu front. The Government of Pakistan, claims a Qadiani weekly paper Lahore, itself requested Mirza Mahmud to send a Battalion on Kashmir front. An Organizing Committee under Mirza Nasir Ahmad (Fatehuddin) was set up which recruited Qadiani volunteers and by June 1948 the Furqan Battalion, under the command of Col. (Retd.) Sardar Muhammad Hayat Qasarani was formed which stationed at Sarai Alamgir near Jhelum. After Qaisarani, Mirza Mubarak Ahmad became its commander. The Furqan camp was named Zubir and the commanding officer was called ‘Alam Kabab’, (a name revealed to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad for the future Muslih Maud, Mirza Mahmud claimed that ‘office’ in 1944). Besides Col. Qaisarani, Maj. Waqi-uz-Zaman (Second in Command), Major Hameed Ahmad Kaleem, Major Abdul Hamid, Major Abdullah Mahar and Cap. Naimatullah Sharif occupied important positions in the Battalion.

The Battalion advanced from Baghsar front to the Valley of Saadabad on 10 July 1948 and occupied a portion of it about miles wide and 5 miles long when the cease-fire took place. Nine Qadianis were killed during Kashmir war.74 As the war was going on, Mirza Mahmud summoned some influential Qadianis to Lahore to start a movement inside the Valley. Khalifa Abdul Manan, the son of Khalifa and an engineer by profession, was called to Lahore and advised to contact some one in the Valley to help in the execution of the Qadiani Plan. He states:

He (Mirza) then said: ‘I want reliable person from the Valley who should be available for operation on the fighting line to’… ‘I (Mannan) at once said: yes, Your Holiness! I have one in mind, but he is presently in Srinagar "Can he come"? He inquired and I said ‘yes’, "but I have no means to communicate with him." ‘You write him and give me the letter.’ I wrote, the message reached him in Srinagar, he left in disguise immediately. He was under orders of arrest from the Emergency Administration. He reached Lahore within a few days, presented himself at Rattan Bagh and started the assigned work and continued to work for years and year." 75

Furqan Force concentrated its activities mostly in the Saadabad Valley Sector. It was a spy rather than a fighting force. The leaders of the Muslim Conference expressed their apprehensions on the Qadiani involvement in Kashmir affairs. Sardar Aftab Ahmad, General Secretary, Muslim Conference, condemned the Qadiani role in Kashmir war and held them responsible for spying and playing an Imperialist inspired game.76

Mirza Mahmud, in his address dated 27 December 1950 states:

‘Sardar Aftab Ahmad, General Secretary Muslim Conference Kashmir, has alleged that Ahmadis had sent the Furqan Force to fight in Kashmir as a part of a conspiracy. They leaked secret reports to the Indian Army. On the basis of their reports the enemy war planes bombarded Pakistan’s strategic positions. All the leading newspapers of the Punjab carried his statement. We made a complaint to the Government stating ‘Why did Government allow us to remain in Kashmir for two years’? The Government asked Sardar Aftab to retract and the Ministry of Kashmir prepared a draft statement and sent it to Karachi to contradict his earlier statement. But Sardar Aftab’s statement appeared in distorted form only in least circulated daily Tamir, Rawalpindi. After sometimes in November 1950 Sardar Aftab repeated the same allegations on the arrival of Sir Owen Dixon mission in Pakistan as mediator on Kashmir question although the volunteer forces had been withdrawn from Kashmir by that time.’77 The Furqan Battalion was disbanded on 17 June 1950. Brig K.M.Sheikh of Pak Army read out the message of Gen Gracey, C-in-C of the Battalion to the Furqan Force in a ceremony held for that special purpose:

Gracey paid a glowing tribute to Furqan Battalion in his message dated 17 June 1950. The text of the message to the Battalion from the notorious General Sir Douglas Gracey, K.C.I.C.B.E., M.C., Commander in Chief (Furqan Battalion) is given below:

"Your offer to provide a volunteer force in the fight for liberation of Kashmir in June, 1948 was gratefully accepted, and the Furqan Bn came into being. After a short period of training during the summer of 1948, you were soon ready to take your place in the field. In September 1948 you were placed under Commander MALF.   Your Bn was composed entirely of volunteers who came from all walks of life, young peasants, students, teachers, men in business, they were all imbued with the spirit of service for Pakistan; you accepted no renumeration, and no publicity for the self sacrifice for which you all volunteered. Yours was a noble cause.

You impressed us all with your keenness to learn, and the enthusiasm you brought with you. You and your officers soon got over many difficulties that face a young unit.

In Kashmir you were allotted an important sector, and very soon you justified the reliance placed on you and you nobly acquitted yourself in battle against heavy enemy ground and air attacks, with not losing a single inch of ground.

Your conduct both individual and collective and your discipline have been of a very high order.

As your mission is over and your Bn is under orders to disband. I wish to thank every one of you for the services you have rendered to your country. Khuda Hafiz." 78


Mirza Mahmud made no secret of his political motives after his arrival in Pakistan. On 22 July 1948 he visited Baluchistan on a political mission where a secret Independent Baluchistan movement was going on with the British backings. He declared to turn Baluchistan into a Qadiani province so that it could serve as a base for further infiltration into territories of Pakistan.

It may be of interest to know that the Greater Baluchistan Scheme was prepared during the Second World War by pro-Axis elements. Hitler desired to reach India to inflict heavy blow on British Imperialism. After formation of the INA by Babu Subash Bose, Germany strongly felt the need to reach Baluchistan through Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The plan was prepared in the State of Kalat. A book on Greater Baluchistan Plan was also published. The British confiscated all copies of the book in 1942.79

With the end of the Second War, the British took keen interest in Baluchistan affairs for its strategic importance as it could prove a bulwark against Russian expansionism. They encouraged Indpendent Baluchistan elements. The political Agent of Quetta, D.Y.Fell, and the Congress party were involved in a conspiracy in Baluchistan.80 Khan of Kalat was assured all British help including recognition of the independent status of the state like that of Nepal. The British troops could station for fifty years as they had been in Egypt. To carry out this plan Col. Sir Jaffery Prior, the A.G.G. of Baluchistan visited Kalat to deliver Lord Mountbatten’s message to the Khan. It was proposed that an All Baluchistan Conference should be convened to get support for the Independent Baluchistan Plan. The Khan conveyed the plan to the Quaid. He immediately took up the matter with Mountbatten. Lord Mountbatten sent the following secret message to Jaffery:

‘Stop Baluch Conference. Khan Kalat Most untrustworthy.’ 81 At the time of Partition, Khan Kalat again hobnobbed with the British to secure an independent status for Baluchistan. The Shahi Jirga of Baluchistan had already decided to join Pakistan in the end of June 1947 but the question of the merger of Kalat State was still unresolved. On 19 December 1947 the Foreign Minister of Kalat, D.Y.Fell, in reply to a question in Dewan-i-Aam stated that despite all efforts no agreement had been reached with Pakistan regarding the annexation of the State. The agreement related to the future relations between them. The Kalat State proposed to surrender the control of means of communications and foreign affairs to Pakistan but Pakistan insisted on unconditional annexation of the State, and encouraged the rulers of Makran and Lasbella to challenge the sovereignty of Kalat State.82

W.Wilcox gives the following version of the annexation of Kalat State: Khan Kalat had employed Englishmen a few days before Pakistan to command his army and serve him as Foreign Minister. On 12 August 1947 New York Times reported that ‘Pakistan recognized Kalat as an independent sovereign state with the status different from that of the Indian States.’ The next day The Times printed a map of Kalat and Makran as independent states. On 15 August, the Khan proclaimed Kalat independence. 83Douglas Fell, the Foreign Minister looked for help from the British to maintain the independent status of the State and the Khan’s brother and uncle sought aid from Kabul.

In January 1948 Liaqat Ali Khan met Kalat Defense Minister in Peshawar. The Quaid saw the Khan and other sardars when he traveled to Sibi to address Shahi jirga. On 25 February the Kalat National party sponsored a 'non accession bill' in Awan-i-Aam (Lower House) and Fell left for London in search of support. Dawn, Karachi carried the following banner line: 'The Khan of Kalat has direct treaty relations with the British.'84 Consequently Pakistan decided to move its army into Baluchistan and recognized the accession of Makran, Kharan and Lasbella thereby isolating Kalat from the sea and the Iranian border. Khan of Kalat announced his decision to join Pakistan unconditionally on 27 March 1948.

After the Kalat's accession, Prince Karim a relative of the Khan was dismissed from the Governor-ship of Makran. He escaped to Afghanistan to recruit a tribal army for fighting against Pakistan army. Fell and Anderson supported the rebel leader and got financial support from Khan of Kalat. On 16 June, Karim and other rebels were arrested by the Pakistan Army.85 Khan of Kalat in his autobiography calls the Agent to the Governor General, Foreign Minister and Col.S.B.Shah, as black sheep who opposed to the idea of Kalat's merger with Pakistan.86

Against this political background one can fully assess the nature of Mirza Mahmud's visit to Quetta in July 1948 and his utterance regarding establishment of an Ahmadiyya state in Baluchistan:

‘The entire population of British Baluchistan - now called Pak Baluchistan - is about five to six lakhs. Although the population of this Province is less than that of others, it has an importance of its own as a unit has the same value in a state as an individual has in a society. To illustrate one may refer to the Constitution of America. In America every state is represented by an equal number of members in the Senate irrespective of its population which may be one crore or ten crores. In short, although the population of Pak Baluchistan is only 5-6 lakhs or 11 lakhs including the States, it has its importance as a unit. It is difficult to convert a big population to Ahmadiyyat but it is easy to convert a small population. If, therefore, the community pays full attention to this program this province can be converted over to Ahmadiyyat in a very short time. Remember, our missionary work can never succeed unless we have a strong base. A strong base is a prerequisite for Tabligh (Propagation of ideas). Therefore, you should first of all try to make your base strong. Have a base of your own somewhere. Let it be any where. If we convert the whole of this province to Ahmadiyyat, we shall be in a position to call at least one province as our own. And this can be done very easily.’87

Mirza Mahmud’s Testimony

Munir Committee (1954) asked the following questions to Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad (MBMA) regarding the establishment of a Qadiani state in Baluchistan:

Munir Report records:

‘Reliance has also been placed in this connection on Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad’s speech in Quetta, published in the AlFazl of 13 August 1948, in which he appealed to his Community to intensify their propaganda in Baluchistan, so that province may become a base for future operations and on his address at the Annual Meeting of Sadre Anjuman Ahmadiyya, Rabwah during the Christmas of 1951 which was published in the AlFazl of 16 January 1952 in the course of which he made an impassioned appeal to his followers to accelerate and intensify their proselytising activities so that persons who had hitherto been unbelievers may fall into the fold of Ahmadiyyat by the end of 1952. The address published in the AlFazl of 11 January, 1952 in which Ahmadis were persuaded not to concentrate in one department, namely the army, but to disperse in all other departments, has also been referred to as well as several reports submitted by Ahmadi Government officers or officials to the headquarters of the results of their tabligh.’90

Pindi Conspiracy Case

On the midnight of 9 March 1951, Major General Akbar Khan, Chief of the General Staff, Pakistan Army, Brig. M.A.Latif and some civilians were arrested on the charge of hatching a conspiracy to create commotion in the country by violent means and to overthrow the then existing Government of which the late Liaqat Ali Khan was Prime Minister. Major General Nazir Ahmad Qadiani, a close relative of Sir Zafarullah, was at the Imperial Defense College in London on a training course from where he was brought back and was arrested.

From a Socialist’s point of view, ‘The Rawalpindi ‘Conspiracy’ was bungled from the very start. The mastermind was Maj Gen Akbar Khan, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army. Akbar had fought in the war to liberate Kashmir and felt that he had been betrayed by the political leadership. He was considered to be progressive, a pro-Nasserite army radical, and the officers who supported him were a mixed bag ranging from neo-Fascists to national chauvinists. The tiny Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) also got embroiled in this mess. Sajjad Zaheer told me that he had met Akbar at cocktail party and the general had broached the subject and ‘requested help’ to draft manifestoes and a possible plan of action. The CPP leadership accepted the offer and participated in various meetings with army officers. Eventually it was decided to shelve the plan for some time, but a conspirator, fearing that the truth might be revealed at a later stage, turned informer and the ‘conspiracy’ was unveiled. The army officers and Communist leaders were arrested.’91

The interpretation that since the Pakistan army was cheated out of victory by the cease-fire in Kashmir,92 they made a plan to over throw the Government is not generally accepted. Zafarullah Poshni and Air Commodore Janjua, who themselves were involved in the conspiracy case, call it a myth. The real motive, says Zafarullah Poshni, was to change the Government which was a ‘corrupt, nepotism-ridden, inefficient and weak-kneed bunch of characters totally subservient to British Imperialist domination.’ 93 Brig Sadeeq Khan, another accomplice in the Pindi Conspiracy case, reveals that Sir Zafarullah gave a cease-fire signal in the Security Council precisely at the time (January, 1949) when India had got some strategic gains in Kashmir. We accepted the cease-fire without getting any political advantages out of our successes in the war. He states that Sikander Mirza opposed Liaqat. He wanted to see Ayub Khan in C-in-C uniform. They were good friends. Through Ayub Khan’s military influence, he thought to attain power by removing his opponents from the way. 94

There is another plausible version of conspiracy, which proves it a British inspired 95 rather than a pro-Soviet plot:

  1. Qadianis, being the stooges of the British Imperialism and their stakes in the affairs in the event of a successful coup that the military officers were not Communists; they could not have been any thing but pro-British.
  2. Of the Communist Party of British India, like other colonial British parties, had generally been an extension of British political indifference and not ‘made in Moscow.’ Moreover, the British intelligence had always had a certain presence within the party itself. 96
  3. A Soviet connected plot would appear to be highly stupid at a time when Liaqat Ali was known to be trying to distance himself from both Britain and the US. He had told the British that Pakistan should not be taken for granted. He had declined all offers and pressure to enter the so-called Middle East Defense Organization being then vigorously put forth by the US. On the other hand, the removal of Liaqat Ali had the effect of drawing in Pakistan closer and closer into a system of western alliances, from which it has neither benefited nor been able to detach itself effectively. 97
All this had us to believe that it was a British-inspired plot and Qadianis were definitely involved in it. Subsequent events further confirm our belief.

Liaqat’s Assassination

Within a span of four years, Liaqat Ali Khan came to know of Qadiani prophecies and utterances regarding the creation of an Ahmadiyya State in Kashmir and Baluchistan. In the wake of their policy and aspirations for a united India he ordered the creation of a Special Intelligence Cell to prepare a list of Qadianis in sensitive positions and to keep an eye on their activities.98 The same year saw the discovery of military officers plot (Pindi Conspiracy Case) to overthrow the Government. In the following year Liaqat was assassinated in broad daylight. The assassin was killed on the spot and the murder has since remained an unsolved mystery. Liaqat was said to have been planning a heavy reshuffle of his Cabinet.

A Jewish paper, the Jerusalem Post, in its 23 October 1951 issue, wrote an interesting editorial on the assassination of Liaqat Ali. It first noted the holding of the ‘Pan Islamic Conference in Karachi last May (1951) and Liaqat Ali’s agreement ‘to the appointment (as its Secretary General) of Aminul Hussaini’ (the late grand Mufti of Palestine) and then went on to observe that, it may well be that in doing so he signed the bill for his execution.’99 What the Post seemed to suggest was that ‘even if he (the Mufti) has not been directly involved in Liaqat Ali Khan’s death, nevertheless, the support of a man of his caliber has encouraged local Muslim fire brands to put their threats into action.100 However, even if Liaqat Ali has been killed by the Mufti ‘fans’, the Post could not restrain itself from commenting that the "smooth shuffling following the murder was so rapid as to appear readily planned for any emergency." 101

Mian Mumtaz Mahmud Khan Daultana made a startling disclosure of our history in August 1983, when he hinted at involvement of Nawab Mushraq Ahmad Gurmani, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan [Zafarullah was in New York at the time of Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination] and Sardar Bahadur Khan in the assassination of Liaqat Ali. The reason he divulged was that Liaqat wanted to nominate Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar as Deputy Prime Minister, take Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy in the Federal Cabinet and bringing I.I Chundrigar as the Governor of Punjab as he had decided to dismiss Ghulam Muhammad from the Cabinet.

As Liaqat decided to make the administrative changes announced at a public meeting at Rawalpindi along with some other important announcements on 16 October 1951 he was shot dead before he could utter a word. Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar, who rushed to Rawalpindi immediately after he heard about the catastrophe, was not allowed to enter the room where the so-called Cabinet was in session, although after the demise of the Prime Minister there should have been no Cabinet. This was the so-called meeting of the Cabinet where the decision to nominate Ghulam Muhammad as Governor General and Khawaja Nazimuddin as Prime Minister was taken. He said that the entire Muslim League and its Secretary General, Ch.Muhammad Ali were supporting Sardar Abdul Rab Nishtar as the next Prime Minister but the League view was not honoured which was the first setback to the concept of political parties in Pakistan. He said that even Sardar Nishtar did not resist as he thought it not fit to create any political controversy at that juncture of history. He further disclosed that Liaqat Ali Khan had discussed the matter of the administrative changes with him being the Chief Minister of Punjab on 14 October only two days before his murder.102

Unrealistic Foreign Policy

Pakistan could not adopt an independent foreign policy and remained tied to the Imperialist interests owing to Sir Zafarullah. Pakistan relations with the USSR remained tense and cool in early years after our independence. The first move to establish diplomatic relations with Russia was made in mid April 1948 not out of sincerity but to win the sympathies of western powers on Kashmir issue. Zafarullah, in a meeting with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko in New York proposed to exchange ambassadors. But it had no effect on the attitude of Western country because Pakistan nominee to Russia presented his credentials in Moscow on 31 December, 1949 and his counterpart from Russia come to Pakistan even late in march 1950. Another opportunity to establish relation with Russia came when Liaqat Ali was invited by Moscow. He instead professed to visit Washington because his influential Foreign Minister was an agent of Imperialism and had long been paving way to push Pakistan into western bloc. He was eager to set up Ahmadiyya Missions in Europe and America in accordance with the prophecies of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and his successor Mirza Mahmud.103

The secret documents made public in London after expiry of 30 year statutory period reveal that the year (1949) Liaqat Ali Khan was invited to visit the Soviet Union, China had gone Red. The Russian invitation caused considerable concern in Whitehall and the Commonwealth Relations Office Pakistan Desk was inundated with dispatches from British envoys, foreign and Pakistan press reports. The documents give the year another significance. It was the time when the Commonwealth Office had prepared (September 1949) an appraisal of India’s foreign policy which stated its "deep-seated unwillingness to accept the division of the Indian subcontinent and a consequent basic hostility to Pakistan."104

The Indian leaders felt attracted to Moscow. Nehru had sent first his sister Vijay Laxmi Pandit and, after her, Dr Radhakrishnan as India’s envoy to Kremlin. New Delhi seemed unduly upset by the Soviet invitation of June 1949 to Pakistan Prime Minister. They feared that Russians, by treating Pakistan as a leading Muslim nation might strive for anew pro-Soviet alignment of Muslim and Arabs through out the Middle East.

Britain’s assessment was that neither Pakistan was going over to Communist Camp nor the acceptance would materialize. They persuaded Americans to invite Liaqat Ali to Washington to take the sting out of any visit he paid to Moscow. The documents revealed that help for Britain’s efforts came from an unexpected quarter. Before the Foreign Office could formally approach State Department, Mr. Ghulam Muhammad Pakistan’s Finance Minister, while in Washington, seems to have taken the matter out of British hands (by) expressing support for the idea of an invitation to Pakistan Prime Minister to visit Washington. The invitation would be extended by Assistant Secretary of State, George McGhee, when he visited Karachi in December 1949. The British Embassy in Washington informed the Foreign Office late in November on the basis of confidential information from the State Department.

Documents reveal that Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, told Attlee (14 June) to bring a reversion of feeling in Britain’s favour by making an over indication regarding ‘current Indian policy towards delay, if not obstruction of plebiscite in Kashmir.’ Baker also advised that the Foreign Office should approach the State Department to take steps for a majority vote in the UNCIP for securing an acceptance of arbitral procedure in the Kashmir dispute. This was subsequently done, the documents say.

"The Moscow visit did not take place. Why? The then Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Zafarullah Khan, had made clear at an American Embassy reception in Karachi that Pakistan was quite ready to leave the next move to the Russians, Sir Graffety Smith (the British High Commissioner in Pakistan) reported on July 21 to London. He quoted Sir Zafarullah as saying they have asked us, we have accepted. The next move is up to them. Which move the Russians obviously did not make.’105

Korean War

Pakistan, being an ally of America, fully supported the US policy on the Korean crisis and was even willing to offer a brigade of Pakistani troops which the United States had offered to equip with modern weapons. Further Pakistan not only signed the Japanese Peace Treaty, but also provided full support to it from the floor of the Conference. Pakistan’s unequivocal support at a critical juncture left a deep impression on the minds of Americans.106 Two years later Dulles, as Secretay of State, supporting Pakistan’s request for the supply of wheat, recalled that at the time of Japanese Peace Treaty, the Soviet Union tried to portray the treaty as being imposed upon Japan by a few Western powers headed by the US, and that "at that juncture Pakistan furnished a leadership which brought to that Conference a substantial number of Asian countries."107


Pakistan voted in favour of the representation to the People’s Republic of China in the UN in 1950, but there after up to 1960 voted for the US sponsored resolutions for the postponement of the question of China’s seat in the UN.108 Mirza Mahmud, in his covert language of revelation and dream, states that he saw the Government of Pakistan had paid a glowing tribute to Zafarullah Khan in a statement which had established the international position of Pakistan. It was becoming evident that in the UN to British or American circles India was likely to gain importance as a result of its likely service to check the Russian influence in China but at that time Zafarullah Khan offered his services and explained that Pakistan could also render this service.109

Muslim States

Pakistan served actively in the cause of independence of Indonesia, Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland, but none of these nations had any ties with Pakistan other than the cultural.110 The relations with other Muslim State were also deplorable due to our pro-British stance. ‘When Iran, then Egypt and then Iraq exploded against Britain in the summer and autumn of 1951, Pakistan found itself in an embarrassing situation. It had a policy of close friendship with these countries; at the same times their immediate actions were prejudicial to its interests. Iran’s abrogation of Britain’s oil rights threatened Pakistan’s essential oil supply. Egypt’s efforts at that time to break the treaty concerning the Suez Canal could have interfered with the flow of trade to Pakistan from the West. Further Pakistan wanted British support in the UN in its quarrel with India. Hence it tried to soothe both sides.’111

On 16 October 1951 the Egyptian Parliament approved the unilateral abrogation of Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and proclaimed Farooq as King. There was an exultant mood in Egypt. Newspapers proclaimed ‘King and people break the fetters of British Imperialism.’ Anti-British demonstration flared up in Ismailiya and Port Said and armed clashes occurred between Egyptian guerrilla squads and British army between November 1951 - January 1952. The Wafd Government was not prepared to risk armed combat with British troops. On 27 January 1952 Martial Law was proclaimed and King Farooq dismissed Nahas Government. Four Prime Ministers held office in the next six months. On 22 July 1952 the Free Officers seized power.112

In February 1952 when an anti-British movement was going on in Egypt, Zafarullah on his return from London paid a friendly visit to Cairo. It was resented by the Egyptian nationalists. They felt that an ‘emissary of British Prime Minister had come to persuade King Farooq to maintain hated colonialist status quo over the British evacuation of the Suez Canal base.’

Zafarullah held meetings with Ali Mehr Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt and King Farooq. Soon after his arrival, the Mufti of Egypt As-Sheikh Hasnain Muhammad Makhlov issued a fatwa in which he exposed Qadiani heresy, condemned Zafarullah as Kafir and criticized the past political role played by the Ahmadiyya movement against Islam and the integrity of the Arabs states. The Arab press gave it a wider publicity which resulted in deterioration of our relations with the Islamic world. Some Arab countries dplored Pakistan’s pro-West policy and criticized its unwholesome attitude towards Arab nationalism. Zafarullah, in the capacity of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan asked the Pakistan Ambassador at Cairo to officially protest to Egypt against the fatwa. Prime Minister of Egypt, Najib Hilali took the matter to King Farooq and requested him to sign a contradictory statement which he refused. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat says that Hilali tendered his resignation over this issue (28 June 1952).113 Mirza Mahmud wrote a letter to the daily Alyum, Cairo to explain the Ahmadiyya beliefs. He clarified Ahmadiyya prophecy concerning their return to Qadian, which the paper maintained, would take place after launching an attack on India. He requested the Egyptian and Arab press to help in promotion of friendly relations with Pakistan. 114

Zafarullah claims that he met Anthony Eden, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and discussed the issue of withdrawal of British forces from the Suez. He visited Cairo and London several times to remove intervening difficulties. In Cairo, Ambassador Kaffery of the United States was eager to help him and his assistance proved very valuable. Eden managed to get an appointment for Zafarullah with British Prime Minister Churchill. Before Zafarullah could call on him, General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander of the British forces in Suez, held a secret meeting with him. General Robertson explained him that the British military presence in Suez was an anachronism and they should withdraw. Moreover, the Revolution in Egypt was backed by the people and would come to stay.

Zafarullah called on British Prime Minster and discussed the issue with him. His response was positive. At last an agreement on the withdrawal of British forces from Egypt was concluded in conformity with the terms of the agreement made with the Egyptian revolutionary authorities. Zafarullah claims that Gamal Abdul Nasir remembered and appreciated his service rendered in this matter.115

Britain concluded different agreements with Egypt at different occasions. A first agreement laying down general principles was initialed on 27 July 1954 and a final one on 19 October 1954. It was a boon to the Egyptian forces which were then battling for the supremacy against a combined civilian military opposition led by the Muslim Brethren (Akhwans). Although it still tied Egypt to a British military alliance of sorts, to general egyptian public it meant the ultimate triumph over Imperialism after nearby 75 years of the physical presence of British troops in the country. The last British troops left Port Said on 13 June, and on 18th Jamal Nasir ceremoniously raised the Egyptian flag over Navy House there.116

An Ally of Zionists

Zafarullah believed that the Zionist State of Israel is a ‘reality’ and has come into existence whether we recognize it or not. An interesting letter appeared in the Pakistan Times: "In reply to a question in Karachi recently, Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, said that as a realist he had to accept the position that whatever one’s own stand in the matter, in actual fact the State of Israel had come into existence. This indicates that even Sir Muhammad Zafarullah is prepared to accept the logic of fait accompli. The Minister’s provision, whatever one’s own stand in the matter, could only thinly disguise this preparedness to wash off hands from any territory which may be forcibly snatched away from Muslims."117 In the UN forums, Sir Zafarullah had a chance to discuss varied political issues with Israeli envoys. Zionists of India published a monthly journal Indian and Israel from Bombay. Its editor was F.W.Pollack and H.Eschablim worked as its Assistant Editor. Pollack was a good friend of Mahatma Gandhi. He was also the Trade Commissioner of Israel for India and South East Asia. The aim of the paper was to promote friendly relations between India and Israel. It published a photograph of Sir Zafarullah, Pakistan Foreign Minister with A.Aban, Isreal’s Permanent Representative at the UN. Zafarullah was seen chatting with him in friendly manner. The paper wrote the following lines under their photograph: "Though diplomatic relations have not yet been established between Israel and Pakistan, the United Nations provide a welcome platform for diplomats of both countries to exchange views on Asian problems effecting both nations." 118  


  1. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol X P.747
  2. AlFazl Lahore, 31 July, 1949
  3. Mirza Muhammad Hussain, Fitna Inkar-I-Khatam-I-Nabuwat, Lahore, 1978 P.192
  4. Mumtaz Ahmad Farooqi, Fateh Haq, Lahore P.48
  5. Mirza Bashir Ahmad, Muzalam-I-Qadian Ka Khooneen Roznamcha, Lahore, 1949
  6. Tarikh Vol X P. 74
  7. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol XInPp. 195-219
  8. Pakistan Times, Lahore, 17 October, 1947
  9. Security Council Record Speeches of Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, Representative of Pakistan, 24 January, 1948
  10. The Hindustan Times, 31 October, 1974 quoted ‘From the World Press’, compiled by B.A.Rafiq of London Mission
  11. AlFurqan Rabwah, Dervishan-I-Qadian Number, July-September, 1963
  12. AlFurqan Rabwah, November, 1966
  13. The Hindustan Times, 31 October, 1974, Dr Dinsha Mehta was Mahatma Gandhi’s representative who visited Qadian alongwith Suhrawardy on 23 October, 1974. They met Mirza Bashir Ahmad, Amir Jama'at Qadian, Mirza Nasir Ahmad, Malik Ghulam Farid, Molvi Jalaluddin Shams, and Mirza Munwar Ahmad. Earlier Krishna Muriti and Dr Sophist came to see Qadian with Sarabai on 19 October 1947 and assured all help to Ahmadis.(Malik Salahud Din MA, Tabieen Ashab-I-Ahmad, Vol VII, Lahore Art Press, Lahore, 1971 PP 65-66)
  14. "For nearly 40 year (1908-1947) Qadian was as it were a miniature Vatican, not sovereign, but some thing of a state with in a state. Crime in Qadian, for instance, was invariably reported first to the Ahmadi office and then to Police’, says O.H.Kspate (Prof. London School of Economics) whose service were acquired by Mirza Mahmud for presentation of Ahmadiyya case to the Punjab Boundary Commission), India and Pakistan, London P.190
  15. The Moslim World April, 1855-S.E.Brush, Ahmadiyyat in Pakistan -P.148
  16. Munir Report P.196
  17. AlFazl Lahore 26 November, 1947
  18. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, Haqiqat-I-Roya, P.35
  19. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Dafa-ul-Bala, Qadian P.11
  20. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Dur-I-Samin, Qadian
  21. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Ashtihar Chanda Minara-tul-Masih, Qadian 28 May, 1900
  22. Tazkira P.127
  23. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, Alwasyat, Qadian P.25
  24. Tarikh Vol Xii P.376
  25. Supplement Tehrik-I-Jadid Rabwah December 1971
  26. AlFazl Lahore, 25 October, 1947
  27. AlFazl Rabwah, 15 March, 1957
  28. AlFazl Lahore, 25 October, 1947
  29. AlFazl Lahore, 4 December, 1947
  30. AlFazl Lahore,7 December, 1947
  31. Barkat Ahmad Rajiki, Tehrik-I-Ahmadiyyat, Qadia, P.6
  32. Ibid
  33. Ibid
  34. Qadiani were pressing for his Chief Ministership of the Punjab-AlFazl Lahore, 29 November, 1947
  35. Nawab of Bhopal was the Chancellor of Chamber of Princes at that time. He wanted to abdicate in favour of his daughter. He approached Lord Mountbatten first with the request of a Stand Still Agreement without acceding to India. When refused, he sent his constitutional Adviser, Sir Zafarullah to discuss Terms of Accession. He was told that no alteration in the Instrument would be possible. Nawab Bhopal was an ally of Sir Conard Cornfield, head of Political Department of British India and Political Adviser to the Viceroy. He is the same fellow who destroyed 4 tons of most valuable papers concerning Princes which included top secret letters and instructions on the British Imperialist policy in India. Zafarullah worked to secure a unique place for the Princes in the wake of new constitutional set up of India and Pakistan. Nawab Bhopal, however, subsequently announced the State’s accession to India with the Quaid’s consent.
  36. Outlook, Karachi 6 July 1974 Suharwardy was also engaged in Sovereign Bengal movement with Sarat Chandra Bose at that time, see Amllendu De, Islam in Modern India, Maya Prakashan, Calcutta, 1982, PP 230-242
  37. Quoted in AlFazl Lahore, 31 December, 1947
  38. Sir Mirza Ismail, My Public Life, P.100
  39. Pakistan Times Lahore 24 November, 1980
  40. Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Indian Perspectives) Edited by K. Arif, Vanguard Book Ltd. 1984 P.41
  41. Impact International UK, 27 September, 1974
  42. AlFazl lahore, 4 December, 1947
  43. AlFazl Lahore, 21 December, 1947
  44. AlFazl lahore, Ist December, 1947 Jang Karachi, 24 December, 1947
  45. AlFazl Lahore, 19 December, 1947
  46. Tarikh-I- Ahmadiyya Vol XII PP.280-310
  47. Ibid P.321
  48. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol XII P. 343
  49. Ibid P.354
  50. Rais Ahmad Jaffery, Hyderabad Jo Kabhi Tha, Lahore 1960 P.73
  51. Mirza Mahmud Ahamd’s address AlFazl Lahore, 21 September, 1948
  52. Ibid
  53. Tabligh-e-Risalat, Edit by Mir Qasim Ali, Vol VI, P.69
  54. AlFazl Lahore, 13 August, 1948
  55. Impact London, 27 September, 1974
  56. Al-Islah Srinagar, 4 July, 1946
  57. AlFazl Qadian, Ist February, 1946
  58. AlFazl Qadian, 10 January, 1946
  59. AlFazl Qadian, 20 June, 1946
  60. AlFazl Qadian, 11, April, 1947
  61. Tarikh Vol VI, p.656 It is interesting to note that AlFazl, Lahore did not mention in any of its issues of October-November, 1947, the formation of Azad Government by Gilkar, Sardar Gul Ahmad Kausar, Editor Hamara Kashmir, Muzaffarabad wrote an article in his paper on 4 October 1953 which is quoted extensively by Qadiani writers in support of their claim-See also Tarikh Ahmadiyyat Vol XI P.322
  62. Bazaz op.cit. P.621 Also Lord Birdwood Two Nations Kashmir, London 1956 P.81
  63. See Assad Ullah Kashmiri Qadianis, Maamar-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir Ghulam Nabi Gilkar, Rawalpindi P.25
  64. Lt. Syed Anwar Shah of Hill Surang, Tehsil Bagh Azad Kashmir and Major Khurshid Anwar under whose command Afgan tribesman attacked Muzaffarabad on 21 October 1947 are other claimants
  65. See also Maulana Taj Mahmud, Azad Kashmir Kee Qaradad Per Mirzaeon Kay Gumrah Kun Propoganday K Maskar Jawab, MTKN, Pakistan, 1973
  66. Philip Warner, Auchinleck, The Lonely Soldier, London 1981, P.225
  67. See Zafarullah, Servant of God, PP 149-152
  68. Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir, London, P.88
  69. Tarikh-I-Ahmadiyya Vol XII P. 324
  70. Sir Zafarullah says that the Security Council was considering the resolution on Plebiscite. Philip Noel Baker, Minister for Common Wealth Affairs talked to Sir Ayenger and Sir Shankar Baj Pai and asked them to try to persuade Prime Minister Nehru to agree to go alongwith the resolution. He was given some hope that the Prime Minister might be brought round, when Mr.Noel Baker received a telegram from Prime Minister Attlee to desist. The resolution was announced that his delegation has been recalled to Delhi for consultation(Servant of God, P.153)
  71. W.Norman Brown, The United States And India And Pakistan, USA P. 189
  72. For Indian Version of Kashmir problem, see Bhagwan Singh, Political Conspiracies of Kashmir, Light and Life Publication, Lukhnow, India, 1973
  73. Speeches and Statements of Mian Iftikharuddin, Edit. By Abdullah Malik, Lahore, 1971, P. 266
  74. Weekly Lahore, Lahore 31 March, 1975 Also Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat, Vol VI, P.267]
  75. Khalifa Abdul Mannan, Kashmir Story, Lahore 1970 P. 120
  76. Shamsul-ulema Mufti Atique Ullah Shah Mufti-I-Azam Poonch, Azad Kashmir Mein Kay Hath Kanday, Supplement the Sadiq Azad Kashmir, 5 January, 1951 P.16
  77. Mirza Mahmud Ahmad’s Address dated 27 December, 1950 Publicity Department, Rabwah
  78. Tarikh, Vol. VI, P.675
  79. Urdu Digest, Lahore, October, 1969
  80. Dr. Inamul Haq Kausar, Pakistan Movement in Baluchistan, Islamabad, PP 36-40
  81. Urdu Digest Lahore October, 1969
  82. AlFazl Lahore, 20 December, 1947
  83. W.W.Wilcox, Pakistan, the Consolidation of State, USA, 1963, P.76
  84. Dawn, Karachi, 28 February, 1948
  85. W.Wilcox, Pakistan, USA 1963 PP.75-81
  86. Mir Ahmad Yar, Inside Baluchistan, Royal Book Co. Karachi, 1975, P.156
  87. AlFazl Lahore, 13 August, 1948
  88. Mirza Mahmud furnished the "proof" for it. He published the photo copy of the letter which the grandfather of Khan of Kalat, Mir Khuda Dad Khan wrote to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani on 11 June, 1903 and requested him to pray for him. He came to know about Mirza Sahib from Hussain Buz of Loralai(Mirza Mahmud, Islami Nazarya, Rabwah 1953) It does not establish, in any way, that Mir Khuda Dad was an Ahmadi.
  89. Tehqiqati Adalat Mein Imaam Hamat Ahmadiyya Ka Bayan, Publicity Department Rabwah, P.30
  90. Munir Report, P.200
  91. Tariq Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People’s Power, Jonathan Cape, London 1970 P.45
  92. Maj.Gen.Akbar Khan’s article in Hikayat, Lahore, September, 1972 Quoted by Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Progressive Publishers, Karachi, 1976 P.85
  93. The Outlook Karachi, 3 February, 1973 . Also see Col(Retd) Hasan Khan’s article on Pindi Conspiracy case in Urdu Digest, Lahore Oct. 1982
  94. Weekly Hurmar, Rawalpindi 1-7 April, 1984 Special Research Report on the Pindi Conspiracy Case. See also Maj-Gen (Retd) Akbar Khan’s interview in Defense Journal, June-July, 1985
  95. Qadianis were very eager to take control of General Head quarters of Pakistan Army in early 50s. Fazal Mahmud Khan Qadiani, Deputy Financial Adviser, Central Ordnance Department Rawalpindi wrote a letter to Mirza Mahmud on 24 February 1949 and gave a few proposals for this sinister plan. (See Mir Ghulam Nabi Nasik, Mirzaeyat Kay Napak Iraday, Rawalpindi 1951)
  96. The Communist Party of India secretly collaborated with the British during the Second World War to sabotage national movements. Arun Shourie, a well known Indian writer has given many startling facts supported by documentation in the four issues of the Illustrated Weekly of India, 18 March-8 April 1984 on the Imperialist-Communist collaboration during early 40s.
  97. Impact London 8-21 October, 1982
  98. Impact International , UK, 27 September, 1974
  99. The Impact London, 8-21 October, 1982
  100. James Solomon Vincent, a Pakistani Secret Service Agent in an exclusive interview with the weekly Takbir, Karachi has revealed that a German Convert Kenzy was responsible to kill Liaqat Ali Khan. Said Akbar, the "alleged assassin" was just a camouflage (Jang Lahore, 9 March 1986) Kenzy embraced Qadianism, became Abdul Shakoor, lived in Quetta and married in Rabwah. He had close relations with Zafarullah family.
  101. The Impact London 8-21 October, 1982
  102. Daily Muslim Islamabad, 25 August, 1983
  103. Nawai-e-Waqat Lahore, 1st February, 1972
  104. Dawn Karachi, 1st February 1985
  105. Dawn Karachi, 1st February, 1985
  106. Sir Zafarullah says that Dean Acheson, who as Secretary of State presided over the Conference and John Foster Dulles, who had conducted the negitiations for the treaty and as incharge of it on behalf of the United States, expressed their gratification to him, (Servant of God,P.175)
  107. Wheat to Pakistan: Hearings on H.R. 5659-5661 before the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 15 June, 1953 PP 8 and 9
  108. Pakistan Foreign Policy, Indian Perspectives, Edited by K. Arif, Vangard Books Limited. Lahore, P.81
  109. AlFazl Rabwah 25 January, 1950 Almubashrat, P.294
  110. N.Brown, op.cit. P.352
  111. N.Brown, op.cit. P.352
  112. Derek Hopwood, Egypt, Allen and Unwin, USA, 1985, P. 33.
  113. Tarikh-i-Ahmadiyyat Vol XVII P.307
  114. Mirza Mahmud letter to Alyum, Egypt Published by Anjuman Taraq-I-Islam, Rabwah, July, 1952
  115. Zafarullah, Servant of God, P.186
  116. P.J.Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, London, 1976 PP.389-390
  117. Pakistan Times 30 June 1949, (Letter of Syed Ghulam Sarwar, Gujrat)
  118. Indian and Israel, Bombay, June 1952